




The Dissertation Committee for Mitch Scott Towner
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:







Health Care and Corporate Finance
by
Mitch Scott Towner, B.A.; M.S.Fin.
DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
December 2015
Dedicated to my family Steve, Lisa, Shelley, and Randy for their amazing
support.
Acknowledgments
I am very grateful to Andres Almazan, Aydoğan Altı (Committee Mem-
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This dissertation examines issues in U.S. healthcare and capital struc-
ture. In the first chapter I give a brief summary of the institutional details of
the U.S. healthcare sector with a special emphasis on healthcare finance. In
addition to its large size, U.S. healthcare has four unique features that can be
used to help answer corporate finance questions: segmented markets, varia-
tion in corporate type, extensive data requirements and recent consolidation.
I explain how changes over the last 100 years have led to each of these fea-
tures. Next, I delve deeper into bargaining between insurance companies and
hospitals, Medicare pricing, and hospital capital structure decisions during my
sample period, 2008-2012. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion on how
the Affordable Care Act has contributed to these factors.
In the second chapter I use the health care industry as a novel labora-
tory in which to study a firm’s strategic use of debt to enhance their bargain-
ing power during negotiations with non-financial stakeholders. I show that
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reimbursement rates negotiated between a hospital and insurers for a specific
procedure are higher when the hospital has more debt. I also show that this
effect is stronger when hospitals have less bargaining power relative to insurers
ex ante, and that hospitals take on more debt when they have less bargaining
power using six proxies including differences in state Medicare laws to further
strengthen identification. This is the first paper to provide direct evidence
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Institutional Details
1.1 Introduction
The U.S. healthcare sector is large and growing with spending of $3.1
trillion in 2014 (17.1% of GDP) and estimates of over $5 trillion by 2022.1.
This makes the U.S. healthcare sector the fifth-largest economy in the world in
2014 at $3.1 trillion, lagging only behind the U.S., China, Japan and Germany.2
This is partly due to the size of the U.S. economy, but the size of the healthcare
sector relative to GDP is also by far the largest of any OECD country. Figure
1.1 shows that U.S. spending as a percentage of GDP has been increasing
relative to other countries since 1980 and today it is almost double the average
of the other OECD countries.
A lot of this spending comes from the high price of insurance, which in
many cases is passed through employer-based insurance, to workers reducing
total consumer surplus. In addition, this industry is worth studying because
of its direct implications on well-being and length and quality of life. For
1Centers for Medicare and Medicaid research on national health expenditures
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2012.pdf
2World GDP figures taken from http://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2015-
data-and-charts.
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these reasons and many more, this industry has been a source of focus for
policymakers, academics, and the general public alike. Furthermore, I argue
healthcare provides an opportunity to provide insight on corporate finance
questions because of four unique institutional features.
First, healthcare provision is segmented geographically for a number of
reasons, including bilateral negotiations between local hospitals and insurance
companies, patient travel costs and the referral system by which general physi-
cians will recommend local specialists. This is beneficial for an econometrician
because there is substantial cross-sectional variation due to local market forces
and government regulation over time. There are 388 metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) and 541 micropolitan statistical areas, which enables the re-
searcher to find similar areas with one-off differences to help isolate a causal
relationship of interest.3
Second, there are nonprofit, for-profit and government hospitals in al-
most every area of the country. This is useful in studying the differences
between each corporate classification with an appropriate counter factual in
the same area. In particular, nonprofits are a huge part of the U.S. economy
that are understudied by academics because of the lack of data availability
and comparison firms. Nonprofit firms have no equity holders and do not
pay taxes, which has important implications on how they raise capital and
their capital structure. These features can also be used to help disentangle
3There is no consensus in terms of the proper level of segmentation. Researchers at the
Dartmouth atlas have classified 306 hospital referral regions (HRRs) as an alternative.
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alternative theories.
Third, government regulation and subsidies have forced extensive data
requirements for hospitals that recently have gotten even more stringent as
part of the Affordable Care Act. This data includes balance sheet informa-
tion, quality measures, prices and utilization figures. The availability of such
detailed panel data for thousands of hospitals can help answer corporate fi-
nance questions.
Finally, there has been substantial consolidation among hospitals and
insurance companies since 1980. With minimal intervention from the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), both groups have continued to merge for efficiency
reasons and to consolidate their bargaining power. This creates substantial
time-series and cross-sectional variation in market competition measures that
can be used for identification. Figure 1.2 shows that the average hospital
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) has increased from 1,500 in 1990 to 2,800
in 2012, as well as the number of mergers each year.
In section 1.2, I describe the basic U.S. healthcare framework and how
it has evolved over time. In section 1.3, I delve deeper into the institutional
details for my sample period, 2008-2012. Section 1.4 concludes with a brief
discussion on the Affordable Care Act.
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1.2 History
In this section, I first describe the major agents involved in healthcare
and then the evolution of U.S. hospitals and health insurance programs, in-
cluding Medicare. The majority of the historical section relies on research
from “In Sickness and In Wealth: Hospitals in the 20th Century”, written by
Rosemary Stevens.
1.2.1 Major Players in U.S. Hospitals
Approximately 100 years ago, healthcare was a fairly standard market
in which consumers (patients) paid providers directly for their services. One
major caveat was that prices were not posted, so patients did not know the
cost in advance. Starting in the 1930s with Blue Cross, local insurance pro-
grams began to help assure that the poor and middle class had access to care
by spreading the risk over the entire population.4 At this point, healthcare
could have been classified as a market with limited regulation and relatively
straightforward bargaining between providers and insurance companies. Over
time, the U.S. government has become more involved in regulating and fund-
ing healthcare so that broadly speaking, the same four groups, patients, care
providers, insurers, and regulators dominate the market today. More precisely,
each of these groups contains multiple different players, and the additional in-
teractions add complexity to the healthcare system.
4Blue Cross, at the time a tax-exempt program, was the solution as it targeted large
local employers, framing itself as a community scheme as opposed to a welfare scheme,
excluding unemployed, elderly and part-time workers.
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Over time, patients have consistently increased demand for healthcare,
while often being shielded from the rising costs. In addition, access to care
has been historically uneven, with limited access for the poor and indigent.
Attempting to resolve these two issues has resulted in more governmental
intervention over time. Healthcare providers range from doctors and therapists
to laboratories and hospitals. I focus on hospitals in this paper because of data
availability and their large influence on healthcare finance.
Generally, there are three different corporate types of hospitals in the
U.S.: nonprofit, government and for-profit hospitals. The majority of hospitals
are nonprofits (approximately 65%), which are historically community-based.
Providing some subsidized care for the poor, they do not pay state or federal
taxes, and rely on endowments and debt to raise capital because they have
no equity holders. Government hospitals receive the majority of their funding
from state, local and federal governments, and provide a disproportionately
high amount of uncompensated care. For-profit hospitals are investor-owned
hospitals that pay taxes and often provide relatively little uncompensated
care. Regardless of organization type, many hospitals are now jointly-owned,
operated or managed in what is known as a hospital system. Belonging to
a hospital system generates a number of benefits for a hospital, including
lower fixed costs and consolidated bargaining power. I further discuss these
differences and their implications in the subsequent sections.
The health insurance industry also contains a variety of organizational
forms, including private, employer and government-sponsored, with some in-
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dividuals covered by multiple programs. Historically, care was reimbursed as
either a percentage of costs or as a fee for service. Fee-for-service programs give
patients more flexibility in the care they receive with greater cost sharing, and
hospitals are reimbursed for each procedure performed. Over the last 30 years,
there have been multiple attempts to control costs and quality of care through
managed care organizations (MCOs), such as preferred provider organizations
(PPOs), or health-maintenance organizations (HMOs). Managed care organi-
zations try to limit unnecessary care and spending with more preventative care
and physician incentives to provide less-costly service through a hybrid of fee-
for-service, per diem and percent-of-charges contracts. Government-sponsored
programs include subsidized insurance for the poor (Medicaid) and programs
for the elderly and disabled (Medicare).
The U.S. government’s role in healthcare goes beyond government hos-
pitals and government-backed insurance through a number of regulatory chan-
nels, including anti-trust regulation and quality assurance. The government
has also been instrumental in the expansion of the U.S. healthcare system both
on the supply and demand side through a variety of bills and legislation. All
the above changes arose due to a lack of care for indigent individuals, rising
costs and an effort to improve the quality of care provided. In the next section,
I describe how access to care has expanded over time.
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1.2.2 Access To Care
Over the last 100 years, healthcare finance has incrementally evolved
from a relatively simple system of payment between patient and provider to
an incredibly complex system that is difficult for anyone to understand. Prior
to 1940, two groups of people had an especially difficult time obtaining health-
care: the poor and those living in rural areas. Charity care was provided by
government and some religious-based groups on a limited basis in urban areas.
However, more than 50% of U.S. counties had no hospitals, and typically few
providers. With smaller populations, it was difficult to fund the buildings and
incentivize doctors to live and provide care in these areas.
At the start of World War II, the federal government sponsored ex-
pansion of the hospital infrastructure in the name national defense under the
Lanham Act. This was the largest government support to date, and helped
set the precedent for subsidized expansion in rural areas (Hill-Burton Act) in
1945. The Hill-Burton Act required all states to survey hospital availability
and plan expansion on a regional basis providing $1 in federal support for every
$2 local groups provided. There was additional support for poor states, ulti-
mately leading to 4,678 projects, mostly in rural areas. This was the first time
the U.S. had a nationally defined, regionally organized framework for health-
care. However, issues remained with many Americans lacking insurance and
no obvious way to distribute the newest treatments from academic centers to
smaller regional hospitals. With the U.S. facing deflation, high unemployment
and anti-communism sentiment in 1949, there was no chance for government
7
health insurance.
The Hill-Burton act helped spur increases in total hospital assets, rising
from $2.7 billion to $5.2 billion between 1947 and 1955, and then doubling
again by the early 1960s. This was the first large expansion in hospital assets,
and was primarily driven by government and nonprofit hospitals. Table 1.1
shows total hospital assets by corporate type from 1947 until 1977. For-profit
hospital assets were stagnant around the Hill-Burton Act, and their increase
in assets would not begin until after Medicare was passed. Similar conclusions
can be drawn by looking at the number of hospitals of each type over time,
as seen in Table 1.2. That being said, there was still substantial regional
variation, with more for-profit hospitals remaining in the South and West.
The post-World War II era was also the one that saw a huge increase
in employer-based health insurance with government subsidies and a favor-
able tax treatment. Table 1.3 shows that insurance coverage went from 9% in
1940 to 50% in 1950 and then close to 70% by 1960. Furthermore, Table 1.3
shows the expansion of these employer-based health insurance programs, as the
market is no longer completely dominated by Blue Cross. Despite the asset
expansion, there were still limited hospital resources, and nonprofit hospitals
were directing these resources to more expensive procedures and patients, for
which they were more likely to receive reimbursements. This tended to be
individuals who were covered by third-party payers, because in 1960, hospitals
were only getting reimbursed at 57.66% of third-payer rates from the gov-
ernment. The expanding prevalence of third-party insurance also contributed
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to hospitals expansion. As they were reimbursed for more procedures, extra
charges were passed on to patients via higher insurance premiums, and the
feedback loop continued. In addition to expanding the number of individuals,
total health insurance benefits skyrocketed from $772 million to $8.7 billion
between 1948 and 1964.
Insurance expansion was largely based on employment, so the elderly
and poor remained largely uninsured. Medicare was established in 1966 as
a government-subsidized insurance for the elderly, and Medicaid was created
as a government-backed insurance program for the poor. Medicare payments
were paid for by the government and organized by intermediaries as the gov-
ernment tried to stay away from directly influencing providers, with 90 percent
of hospitals initially choosing Blue Cross.
Hospitals were reimbursed for reported costs, and the government as-
sumed the hospitals would only increase costs as necessary. Medicare spending
was underestimated from Day 1 as there was more utilization than expected,
rising inflation, and hospitals were using the government payments to expand
their profits. For-profit hospitals were allowed to receive “a reasonable return
on equity capital” as part of Medicare reimbursements. Nonprofit hospitals
could max their income by including costs of borrowing money, which led them
to start to use lots of long-term debt instead of private contributions. Table 1.5
shows the breakdown of funding sources from 1968 until 1981, when the use of
debt went from 38% to 69%, while private contributions were cut by more than
80%. The prevailing wisdom in the 1970s was that proprietary competition
9
led to more efficient markets. Nonprofit hospitals were now praised for making
money, as this was a sign they were operating efficiently even renaming their
status as nonprofit as opposed to not for profit.
After 1970, the vast majority of Americans had some sort of insurance
and there were incentives for hospitals to increase volume as patients were
paying little out of pocket at the time of care. These incentives existed for
both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, with the only real difference being their
tax status, which opened the nonprofit hospitals up for more scrutiny as the
costs and spending increased substantially.
Congress was concerned that hospitals and Blue Cross were gaining
as much from the government subsidies as the beneficiaries. In 1970, Nixon
suggested a health maintenance strategy as a way to restructure, decentralize,
privatize and make healthcare provision more competitive. This was the same
time that hospitals began to consolidate with nonprofit systems and church
systems and that for-profit chains were growing. For example, in 1975 Hospital
Corporations of America (HCA) was receiving 30 percent of its revenue from
Medicare.
Consolidation continued as a means for hospitals to pay down debt
on buildings and as a way to increase bargaining power. By 1982, one-third
of all hospitals and 36 percent of beds belonged to a hospital system. This
consolidation would accelerate in the 1990s and 2000s, as can be seen in Figure
1.2 and Table 1.4. In 2014, 57% of all U.S. acute-care hospitals were part of a
hospital system, defined as two or more hospitals that are either jointly-owned,
10
sponsored, or managed by a central organization.5 These systems tend to be
located within close proximity to one another and provide a number of benefits
for the hospitals. These include minimizing fixed costs and increasing their
market share, which provides greater market power during negotiations over
reimbursement rates.
Hospital costs continued to rise rapidly and in the face of predictions
that the Medicare reserve funds would be exhausted, significant reform was
executed in 1982. Hospital reimbursements were modified from a cost-based,
fee-for-service system to fixed reimbursements for episodes of care called Di-
agnostic Related Groups (DRGs). Most treatment in a hospital could be
grouped into 1 of 467 DRGs. Now hospitals had an incentive to control costs,
as they were only paid a base rate regardless of how much it cost the hospi-
tal.This was later expanded on January 1, 1992, when Medicare introduced the
Medicare Fee For Service (FFS) with reimbursement rates for 7,000 services.
There are base prices determined by a group of 29 specialist physicians and
then adjusted for cost of living by geographic area.6 FFS Medicare patients
are responsible for co-payments for all services, and therefore are subject to
potentially unlimited out-of-pocket risk. Consequently, most individuals will
purchase supplemental insurance known as Medigap to cover the majority of
co-payments.
5http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml
6There are outlier payments made in addition to hospitals that have patients that are
particularly expensive in the care they require.
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Medicare parts A and B had its own set of problems with incentives for
hospitals to diagnosis patients to maximize reimbursement rates and discharge
patients quickly, as any extra resources spent would not be reimbursed. Specif-
ically, the federal government accused many hospitals of shifting the DRGs to
yield a higher reimbursement rate from the Medicare system. One example
was a case brought by federal investigators against HCA in 1997. Silverman
and Skinner (2003) find that both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals were ”up-
coding” by looking at the frequency in which the most generous DRG for
respiratory infections changed from 1989 to 1996. There were also concerns
that this lowered the average level of care to these patients.
One solution to these issues was the advent of Medicare part C, which
started with the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Originally these
were called Medicare+Choice, and as of the Medicare modernization act of
1993, they were rebranded Medicare Advantage. Those who are covered do
not give up any rights to Medicare, but they must use select providers in
surrounding areas. Part C plans are usually HMOs, and patients are required
to have a primary care physician. However, they reduce the out-of-pocket
expenses for the patient by minimizing co-payments and deductibles. Part C
plans have to offer coverage that meets or exceeds standards set by Fee For
Service Medicare, but they do not have to cover every benefit the same way. A
2003 law changed the payment formula to overcompensate Part C plans by 12%
relative to Fee For Service Medicare to encourage more plans for individuals in
rural areas struggling to get the care they need. Traditionally, most Medicare
12
enrollees choose FFS (75% in 2013), but the number of individuals choosing
Medicare Advantage has gone up substantially, from 5.4 million to 15.7 million
in the last 10 years.7
In addition, the insurer market continued to evolve with even more
employer-sponsored plans and the advent of managed-care organizations.8
These organizations are frequently able to bargain discounts because they
limit their patients to certain hospitals providing these hospitals with a steady
stream of patients, whereas traditional insurance does not restrict patients,
and so they choose doctors and hospitals freely. Put differently, hospitals were
forced to become more competitive with their prices to ensure MCO mem-
bership, otherwise they would face a large reduction in patient volume. This
new system of financing has also led to consolidation in the health insurance
market, resulting in 67% of the metropolitan areas and 31 states having an
insurer with a market share greater than 50% by November 2012.9
1.3 Salient Institutional Details 2008-2012
In this section, I emphasize the relevant institutional details for the
sample period of Chapter 2, 2008-2012. In particular, I describe the bargaining
7http://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/medicare-advantage-2014-spotlight-enrollment-
market-update
8HMO plans rely on more cost sharing with patients through co-payments, while PPO
plans generally rely on a large deductible and co-insurance. These programs are significantly
cheaper because the patient pays for the majority of the “first dollars”. These features are
very similar to the differences between traditional FFS Medicare and Medicare Advantage.
92012 edition of AMA’s Competition in Health Insurance: A Comprehensive Study of
U.S. Markets
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process between hospitals and insurance companies, Medicare pricing and the
differences by corporate type, including the factors that determine a hospital’s
capital structure.
1.3.1 Bargaining Between Insurance Companies and Hospitals
The negotiation process between hospitals and insurance companies is
extremely complicated, both initially and upon renegotiation.10 Negotiation
between hospitals and insurance companies is typically done within the local
geographic hospital system level, though the reimbursement rates may vary
hospital by hospital within a system. For example, HCA has regional offices
that will negotiate with local insurers over the reimbursement rates for all
hospitals in the area, but would not bargain for the entire country. There
are exceptions, though, as some mergers have overcome antitrust concerns by
agreeing to bargain separately from the rest of the hospital system.11
The primary determinant of bargaining outcomes is the relative size of
the hospital and insurer. Consistent with standard bargaining theory, hospitals
and insurers with greater market shares are able to demand higher and lower
reimbursement rates, respectively.12 Although size is a major determinant,
there are a number of other factors, including negotiation skill, quality of care,
case mix, solvency, hospital capacity, frequency in which claims are denied and
10In addition to the papers cited below, this section benefited from multiple conversations
with executives at Intermountain Health Care and Hospital Corporations of America.
11Balan and Brand (2014)
12Studies in healthcare that draw these conclusions include Melnick et al. (1992), Brooks
et al. (1997), and Halberasma et al. (2011), among others.
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organizational status. Lewis and Pflum (2014) argue that requisite negotiation
skill is one of the leading reasons for the substantial variation in reimbursement
rates across hospitals. Pauly (1998) and Sorensen (2003) find that even small
MCOs are frequently able to negotiate substantial discounts from hospitals
because of their ability to channel patients to specific hospitals.
The final contracts are typically hundreds of pages with specific reim-
bursement agreements for thousands of procedures. These agreements may
come in the form of fee-for-service, per diem, percentages of costs or some
combination of these. Gaynor, Ho and Town (2015) note that the bargaining
power of the hospital is an important factor in the contract form, with hospi-
tals preferring lower-powered incentives and insurers preferring higher-powered
incentives. Negotiation usually occurs annually unless there is a significant
change in the hospital’s organization such as a merger or a change in system
affiliation.
1.3.2 Medicare Pricing
Medicare enrollees can choose either traditional Fee For Service (FFS)
Medicare or Medicare Advantage.13 FFS permits beneficiaries more flexibility
in care, with greater cost sharing through higher deductibles and co-payments.
Most FFS members mitigate the potential unlimited out-of-pocket expense by
purchasing supplemental insurance known as Medigap policies. FFS Medicare
13Approximately 75% of enrollees choose traditional FFS Medicare and 25% enroll in
Medicare Advantage
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has a provider fee schedule for more than 7,000 services with reimbursement
rates adjusted for geographic differences in cost of living.14 15
Medicare benefits are typically less generous than the typical large em-
ployer. Most part B people pay an insurance premium of $100/month. Since
2007, they have added an income-based premium for wealthy individuals.
Forty percent receive supplemental insurance from a former employer, 30%
get plan C, and most of the rest get private supplemental Medigap insurance.
Policy forbids people from having both Medigap and Part C coverage.
Hospitals have the option to decline FFS Medicare, accept the fee sched-
ule after geographic adjustment, or request additional reimbursements.16 In
the last case, the supplemental reimbursement amounts are bargained over by
Medigap insurers as part of their entire negotiation process. Bargaining varia-
tion for FFS patients is limited to the supplemental payments because the base
rate is set and paid for by the U.S. government. Medicare Advantage patients
are enrolled in MCOs, and the MCOs bargain with hospitals over the entire
reimbursement amount independent of the FFS price. With a larger scope for
negotiation, these prices tend to have greater variation across hospitals.
14The fee schedule is priced on a Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) or more
simply the resources required for the procedure. RBRVS is based on three Relative Value
Units: physician work (52%), practice expense (44%) and malpractice expense (4%).
15Hospitals can also receive supplemental payments for extreme costs known as outlier
payments.
16Virtually all general acute care hospitals accept Medicare, so it is unlikely this would
bias my sample in any way.
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1.3.3 Nonprofit verus for profit
Hospital balance sheet data is complicated by variation in corporate
type and the existence of hospital systems. There is quite a bit of research
that focuses on the differences between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Non-
profits have no equity holders, and so receive financing from revenue, debt,
philanthropy, government subsidies and internal funds. Meanwhile, for-profit
hospitals can issue both debt and equity. In addition, nonprofit hospitals do
not pay state or federal taxes, so they do not receive a traditional debt-tax
shield. This is offset by the fact that nonprofits can borrow more cheaply
because any debt they issue provides abatement at the personal level.
Nonprofit hospitals’ reliance on philanthropy was significantly reduced
after Medicare was passed because hospitals could issue debt and pass on the
costs to the government. By 1983, only 0.4% and 1% of funding came from
philanthropy for nonprofit and government hospitals, respectively.17 In addi-
tion, Sloan et al (1990) find that the increased third party insurance coverage
crowded out donations. Typically, nonprofits are subject to a “project financ-
ing rule,” which requires these hospitals to issue debt only when they have the
capital earmarked for a specific investment. That being said, there are non-
profit hospitals that manipulate their balance sheet to try and take advantage
of their tax exempt status. For example, the University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center was famous for a tax arbitrage scheme in which it was borrowing short-
17Institute of Medicare For Profit Enterprise in Health Care (1986) published by the
National Academy Press)
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term and investing long-term in order to capture the interest-rate spread. This
eventually backfired during the financial crisis as short-term borrowing costs
shot up.
There is extensive literature that suggests that nonprofit hospitals act
similarly to for-profit hospitals along a number of dimensions. After controlling
for size and patient type, Wedig (1988) finds no difference in capital structure
by corporate type. Bowman (2002) finds nonprofit hospitals borrow more
when they receive endowments, consistent with optimizing leverage as if they
follow the trade-off theory of capital structure. Similarly, Wedig et al (1996)
model and find evidence that nonprofit hospitals issue debt until the point
that benefits are offset by agency and bankruptcy risk. Lastly, Duggan (2002)
uses responses to changes in regulation and finds nonprofit hospitals respond
similarly to for-profit hospitals. It is also worth noting that nonprofits are
legally required to provide free care to some patients, and thus are forced to
bargain aggressively with insured patients to ensure they make up for lost
resources and remain a going concern.18
Another complicating factor, especially with respect to balance sheet
data, is that each hospital has to report its financials to the Centers for Medi-
care, but many hospitals are jointly-owned. This means that some systems will
issue debt at the parent level and then transfer assets or liabilities between
subsidiaries. That being said, hospital systems tend to leave autonomy at the
18This argument was made during an interview I had with an executive for a nonprofit
hospital.
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subsidiary level, and a researcher can always value weight or equal weight and
combine measures to the system level.
Summary stats for my sample in 2012 by corporate type can be found
in 1.6. There are a total of 2,197 hospitals, of which 20% are for-profit, 65%
are nonprofit, and 15% are government hospitals. Missing observations for
HHI Insurer are because the hospital is located outside of an MSA. Govern-
ment hospitals have the greatest proportion of these missing, and have both the
highest HHI Insurer and HHI Hospital among the corporate types confirming
they are more likely to be found in rural areas or areas that have insufficient
facilities. They are also significantly less likely to be part of a system, and are
less profitable.
For-profit hospitals are the smallest, have less-volatile earnings, are
more likely to be a part of the system, and use little long-term debt. In
addition to being greatest in frequency, nonprofits on average are the largest,
and have the highest leverage. Table 1.7 shows similar summary statistics split
on whether or not a hospital is part of a system. In 2012, 68% of hospitals were
part of a system. Stand-alone hospitals were smaller, had higher leverage, and
were less likely to be part of a teaching hospital.
1.4 Conclusion
The U.S. healthcare system is a massive economy that has undergone
a series of changes for the last 100 years, eventually leading to the complex
industry it is today. The size of the economy alone warrants academic study,
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but unique institutional features also provide an opportunity to provide in-
sight into corporate finance questions. First, healthcare provision is segmented
geographically, creating cross-sectional variation by metropolitan area. Sec-
ond, there are nonprofit, for-profit and government hospitals in most markets,
enabling comparisons by corporate type. Third, government influence and
intervention has led to substantial data requirements for hospitals. Finally,
the entire industry has undergone consolidation for the last 30 years, creating
time-series variation in market competition measures.
There are broadly four main groups involved in U.S. healthcare: pa-
tients, care providers, insurers and regulators. The role of insurers and regula-
tors in the economy has gradually increased over time to help ensure everyone
had access to care, with a special focus on individuals who are poor or live in
rural areas. The government’s role has also changed with concerns over the
rising costs over time.
Medicare reimbursements have evolved in line with other insurers. At
times, reimbursements have been a percentage of costs or a fixed amount per
procedure, and have evolved to what is now a more complex contract that
uses a combination of per diem, fee-for-service and a percentage of costs to
align the incentives of cheaper costs and quality care. These contracts have
also altered the financing in hospitals, in particular in nonprofit hospitals that
now rely less on donations and more on debt.
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) into law. The goal of the policy was to increase the number
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of individuals that were uninsured by mandating that all individuals purchase
health insurance, eliminating the adverse selection that arises in insurance
markets. The effect would be that younger, healthy individuals can then help
subsidize individuals with pre-existing conditions. It is also hoped that this
will reduce the total cost of the U.S. healthcare sector, because previously
uncovered individuals who relied on more-expensive emergency care will now
use more preventative care with regular physician visits.
The law was supposed to allow individuals to purchase cheaper poli-
cies on state-run exchanges in 2014, but many states refused to operate these
exchanges for political reasons. The Obama administration, coupled with the
states that created exchanges, have now set up a national exchange, which
ensures individuals can purchase insurance and also limits how much insur-
ers can raise their rates. Since the passing of the ACA, the number of big
U.S. health insurers, covering approximately one-third of the market, has de-
creased from five to three (Anthem/Cigna, Aetna/Humana and United). This
consolidation is believed to be a response to smaller profit margins and higher
compliance costs. Similar consolidation is in process by hospital systems in an
effort to increase their bargaining power. It will be interesting to see how far
this consolidation goes and how it affects the pricing of services.
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Chapter 2
Leverage and Bargaining Benefits: Evidence
from U.S. Hospitals
2.1 Introduction
Capital structure research traditionally focuses on the consequences
of debt for a firm’s financial stakeholders (i.e., shareholders and creditors).
However, a firm’s financial structure can also impact other agents with which it
transacts, including employees, customers, and suppliers (e.g., Titman (1984)).
One strand of the literature has argued that debt may strengthen a firm’s
bargaining position vis-á-vis these “non-financial stakeholders,” allowing it to
extract more surplus at these stakeholders’ expense (e.g., Bronars and Deere
(1991)). Existing evidence suggests that firms take on more debt when facing
strong non-financial stakeholders such as unions (Matsa (2010) and Agrawal
and Matsa (2013), among others), consistent with firms levering up when the
benefits of augmenting their bargaining power are high. However, except in
cases of severe financial distress (Benmelech, Bergman and Enriques (2012)),
there is no evidence that debt actually impacts bargaining outcomes. That is,
the most direct implication of the argument that leverage enhances bargaining
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power remains untested.1
The primary challenge in investigating the effect of debt on bargain-
ing is that econometricians rarely observe measurable bargaining outcomes.
Moreover, even if outcomes are observed, heterogeneity in the services or
goods being bargained over in most settings would make assessing such an
effect difficult. This paper uses the health care industry as a novel labora-
tory to overcome this challenge. Two features in particular make this setting
appealing. First, the availability of data on prices negotiated between hospi-
tals and insurers for specific medical procedures, at least some of which are
almost perfectly homogeneous, makes it possible to surmount the data limi-
tation. Second, cross-sectional variation in market structure and state laws
makes it possible to test whether the sensitivity of bargaining outcomes to
a hospital’s debt varies with the ex ante bargaining power of hospitals along
multiple dimensions.
Debt can strengthen a firm’s bargaining position with non-financial
stakeholders for at least two reasons. First, debt commits a firm to pay part
of the surplus created by successful negotiation to creditors in the form of
interest payments. This limits the amount of remaining surplus over which
non-financial stakeholders can bargain.2 Second, most firms repeatedly trans-
1Benmelech, Bergman, and Enriques (2012) present evidence that financially distressed
airlines are able to extract pension concessions from employee labor unions. However, this
is an extreme case. Most firms that take on debt never become financially distressed.
2This is the argument made in Myers (1977) and Hennessy and Livdan (2009), among
others.
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act with the same non-financial stakeholders and face spillover distress costs
if these stakeholders are under financial distress. A firm’s stakeholders there-
fore have incentives to leave the firm with sufficient surplus in order to avoid
financial distress and possibly dissolution (e.g., Perotti and Spier (1993) and
Rajan and Petersen (1995)). I construct a simple model using this intuition
to develop my hypotheses further in Section 2.2.
To test whether debt affects bargaining outcomes, I use annual hospital
balance sheet data and data on reimbursement rates (i.e., prices) negotiated
by hospitals for a specific medical procedure, colonoscopy without biopsy.3 I
focus on this procedure because, unlike most procedures hospitals perform, it
is almost perfectly homogeneous across hospitals. The lack of variation in the
nature of the procedure ensures that differences in prices are due to variation in
bargaining as opposed to differences in quality or quantity of care.4 For other
types of procedures, differences in the care provided across hospitals could be
systematically correlated with both reimbursement rates for the procedure and
other hospital characteristics including capital structure, muddying inference.5
Controlling for hospital and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) char-
acteristics as well as hospital fixed effects to account for other factors that
might affect bargaining outcomes, hospitals with more leverage receive higher
3These prices are for Medicare patients and include all payments received by the hospital.
4Additional care or complications during a colonoscopy lead to alternative classifications
and therefore will not be included in my sample.
5In addition to these endogeneity concerns, pricing data is expensive and I was given a
discount for only purchasing one procedure.
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reimbursement rates. The economic magnitude of the relation is significant:
A one standard deviation increase in a hospital’s book leverage is associ-
ated with an approximately 5% increase in the average margin it receives per
colonoscopy. These results are robust to controlling for a number of variables
including: hospital type, spending, costs, and market competition measures.
While focusing on the price of a homogeneous procedure helps to elimi-
nate one potential source of endogeneity, there remain a number of alternative
explanations for the relation between leverage and reimbursement rates. For
example, manager skill may be an omitted variable in that more skilled hos-
pital managers might be able to both negotiate higher prices and might also
choose to operate with higher leverage for a variety of reasons, including tax
motives. Another concern is that causality could run in the opposite direction
because, holding costs and volume fixed, higher prices imply higher income,
increasing the benefits of debt tax shields. The robustness of the results to
controlling for hospital fixed effects helps to address these concerns by ensur-
ing that any omitted factor must be time-varying within hospitals to explain
them. However, this does not rule out the possibility that such time-varying
factors contaminate causal inference. It is also possible that debt affects re-
imbursement rates for reasons unrelated to bargaining power. For example,
a hospital may finance upgrades to its facilities - which could enable them
to charge higher reimbursement rates - by issuing debt. Alternatively, hos-
pital managers may be motivated to bargain hard with insurers for higher
reimbursement rates when the hospital is highly-leveraged, consistent with
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Jensen’s (1986) argument that the threat of bankruptcy created by debt dis-
ciplines managers.
To further test whether the estimated price-leverage relation is driven
by the bargaining benefits of debt, I examine how the relationship varies with
a hospital’s ex ante bargaining power. A hospital with relatively high ex ante
bargaining power already extracts most of the surplus from its relationships
with non-financial stakeholders, even without the pre-commitment effects of
debt.6 If the relation is driven by leverage allowing a hospital to extract conces-
sions from insurers, then it should be stronger when the hospital’s ex ante bar-
gaining power is weaker. I use the fact that healthcare provision is segmented
geographically to test this prediction by employing six proxies: partnership
status with other hospitals, market share, whether the hospital is located in a
metropolitan area, number of hospitals in the local market, concentration in
the local insurance market and whether the state has requirements on supple-
mental Medigap premiums.7 I find reimbursement rates are more sensitive to
hospital leverage when a hospital is not part of a hospital system, is smaller,
is located in a metropolitan statistical area, competes against more hospitals,
bargains with concentrated insurers and if it is located in states with Medigap
premium laws. These results further support the argument that the relation
between reimbursement rates and hospital leverage is driven by the bargain-
6At the extreme, if the firm has 100% of the bargaining power, debt will not change the
amount the firm receives.
7I use six measures because each measure brings separate endogeneity concerns that do
not hold for other measures. I discuss each of these proxies in more detail when I explain
the data.
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ing benefits of debt. It is unclear why alternative explanations would predict
that the effect of leverage would be greater for hospitals with lower bargaining
power.
It could be argued that hospitals issue debt to invest in nicer facilities
and this enables them to charge higher reimbursement rates because partner-
ship status with other hospitals and capital expenditures are substitutes. In
order to alleviate this concern, I control for a hospital’s capital expenditures
in all regression analyses. In addition, I test the sensitivity of bargaining out-
comes to leverage conditioning on whether assets or liabilities have increased
since the previous year. I find that the relation between leverage and bar-
gaining outcomes only exists after an increase in liabilities and the coefficient
is actually larger if there is no corresponding increase in assets. This result
is more consistent with the bargaining benefits from debt, as opposed to an
investment story.
Tax-based alternative explanations are especially a concern because tax
minimization motives play a major role in capital structure theory. I bolster
the evidence against alternative tax based explanations by exploiting a unique
feature of the health care industry. Some hospitals are for-profit entities, while
others are nonprofit organizations. As nonprofit hospitals do not pay taxes,
any relation between leverage and negotiated prices driven by tax incentives
should hold only among for-profit hospitals. Contrary to this argument, I
find that the relation is stronger in nonprofit hospitals. Overall, the evidence
supports the argument that debt enhances a firm’s negotiation outcomes with
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its non-financial stakeholders.
To date the literature on the bargaining benefits of debt has focused
on the capital structure decisions of firms because negotiation outcomes are
difficult to observe, especially for a broad cross section of firms.8 Consistent
with the prior literature, I find that a hospital’s leverage is negatively related
to its ex ante bargaining power using the same measures of bargaining power
as before. Specifically, I find that hospital leverage is negatively related to
hospital market share, lower when the hospital is a member of a system, and
higher if it operates in a state with Medigap pooling laws. In addition to
confirming findings from the labor literature, these results further validate
my use of these measures of bargaining power as a source of predicted cross-
sectional variation in the sensitivity of reimbursement rates to leverage.
My paper relates to the literature on the strategic use of leverage
during bargaining with a firm’s stakeholders. The bargaining benefits from
debt are theorized in several settings including during negotiations with labor
(Bronars and Deere (1991); Perotti and Spier (1993)); merger negotiations (Is-
rael (1991)); regulated industries bargaining with the government (Dasgupta
and Nanda (1993)); and between suppliers and customers (Hennessy and Liv-
dan (2009) and Chu (2012)). The majority of the empirical work has focused
on bargaining with labor, in particular the relation between firm leverage and
unionization rates. For example, Matsa (2010) uses differences in state laws to
8For example, Agrawal and Matsa (2013), Matsa (2010), Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-
Medina (2009), and Myers and Saretto (2011).
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show that leverage is higher in firms with employee friendly union laws.9 The
only existing paper examining the impact of capital structure on negotiated
outcomes is a recent study by Benmelech, Bergman, and Enriques (2012).
They use variation in pension funding status’ for 12 airlines and find they
receive greater pension concessions from labor when they are financially dis-
tressed. My paper contributes to the literature on the strategic use of leverage
by documenting the bargaining benefit of debt for the entire spectrum of firms
from those under distress to solvent firms that face the possibility of future
distress costs because of their debt commitments.
My paper also contributes to the health care policy debate. Two ma-
jor issues of utmost importance are the high cost of care and lack of price
transparency that may contribute to these costs. There are a number of pa-
pers that examine the impact of market competition on prices in the health
care industry.10 Consistent with Nash bargaining, these papers find reimburse-
ment rates are decreasing in insurance market power and increasing in hospital
market power. These results are consistent across a variety of settings in-
cluding with micro-level data from California (Dor, Grossman and Koroukian
(2004)); with appendectomies acting as an alternative homogeneous opera-
tion (Brooks, Dor and Wong (1997)); and in the Netherlands (Halberasma,
Mikkers, Motchenkova, and Seinen (2011)). My paper contributes to the
health care debate by showing that other factors affect pricing beyond market
9Other empirical papers include Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Medina (2009), and Myers
and Saretto (2011).
10See Gaynor and Voygt (2000) and Dranove and Satterthwait (2000) for surveys.
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competition measures.
In Section 2.2 describes the empirical predictions and strategy. I de-
scribe the data in Section 2.3. Empirical results are in Section 2.4 and I
conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Empirical Predictions and Methodology
Firms have relationships with many non-financial stakeholders, includ-
ing employees, customers, and suppliers. Each relationship a firm has creates
surplus, which is divided between the firm and the stakeholder through bar-
gaining over wages, prices, and/or other terms of trade. A firm increases its
share of the surplus, and hence its total payoff from a relationship if it can
commit itself to a tougher negotiating position prior to bargaining. Debt has
been identified as a potentially powerful device for committing a firm to a
tough negotiating position for at least two reasons: a credible commitment
because the firm has no cash and contagion distress costs.
The first explanation is that debt represents represents a hard com-
mitment to pay out part of the surplus to creditors in the form of interest
payments, which limits the surplus available to the stakeholder during negoti-
ations. As a simple example, consider Firms A and B, each of which bargain
over the division of $100 of surplus at the end of the period with an outside
stakeholder. Before bargaining takes place, firm B borrows $40 to be repaid
at the end of the period with a 0% interest rate and pays the proceeds out
to shareholders as a dividend. This leaves only $60 of available surplus over
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which firm B and its outside stakeholder can bargain. Assuming Nash bar-
gaining with equal bargaining power, firm A’s shareholders receive $50, while
firm B’s shareholders receive $70 ($30 from negotiation and $40 from the div-
idend).11
This intuition is particularly appealing for the labor bargaining litera-
ture because the firm is in control of the cash and therefore, can pay a dividend
to shareholders. Bargaining from the hospital perspective may be slightly dif-
ferent because a hospital does not control the cash ex ante because it relies on
payments from insurance companies. The insurance companies may refuse to
pay the hospital, limiting the hospital’s ability to credibly commit the surplus.
However, because the hospital can commit future payments to its creditors,
this intuition should still hold.
The second reason for the bargaining benefits a hospital receives from
a commitment to creditors derives from potential contagion distress costs for
the stakeholder. A firm’s failure to make its contractual interest payments
generally results in bankruptcy, which not only imposes significant costs on
the firm, but also potentially on the stakeholder. Bankruptcy might result in
closure, which will terminate the firm’s relationship with the stakeholder, re-
ducing the number of relationships from which the stakeholder receives surplus
(e.g., Rajan and Petersen (1995) and Perotti and Spier (1993)). Therefore, the
stakeholder may be willing to accept less of the surplus ex ante because that
11This intuition is the motivation in Myers (1977), Hennessy and Livdan (2009), Das-
gupta and Sengupta (1993), and Dasgupta and Nanda (1993).
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will be less costly than the potential contagion distress costs. I formalize this
argument in a simple two period model.
A firm and stakeholder bargain over surplus that is normalized to 1 in
each of two periods. Without any frictions, the stakeholder will receive α each
period and the firm will receive 1 − α. Prior to the beginning of each period,
the firm has an option to issue short-term debt which is due at the end of the
period with cost c and probability of bankruptcy in the subsequent period of
1 − p. The stakeholder observes the firm’s leverage decision and consequently
in order to facilitate the firm’s solvency, has the option to forego part of the
surplus and receive γ ( < α). I assume that pα > γ, which means that the
stakeholder will never forego surplus in the second period and therefore it is
not optimal for the firm to issue debt in the second period. This framework
can be solved using backward induction.
In the second period as shown, the firm will not issue debt by con-
struction and thus the payoffs are α and 1 − α for the stakeholder and firm,
respectively. If the firm chooses to issue debt in the first period, the decision
to forego will compare the guaranteed payoffs of γ + α with the risky payoff
from bargaining aggressively p(α + α). This implies that the stakeholder will
forego the surplus in period 1 if p < γ+α
2α
. Intuitively, the stakeholder is more
likely to forego the surplus if the probability of bankruptcy is higher and/or if
the amount it has to forego is smaller. The firm will only issue debt if knows
the stakeholder is willing to forego the surplus and that the cost is smaller
than the concession it will receive (c < α− γ).
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This framework can be extended to T periods with similar results. In
the final period the firm will never issue debt by construction. The decision
in period T-1 is identical to the two period model because the stakeholder
is considering whether or not to give up part of the surplus for one period
to ensure solvency in the final period. If it is willing to forego part of the
surplus in T-1, it will also be willing to give up the surplus in all prior periods
because the potential lost surplus in bankruptcy is greater with more periods
remaining. If the stakeholder is unwilling to forego the surplus in period T-1,
(p > γ+α
2α
), it still may be willing to give up the surplus in an earlier period.
Following backward induction, it would be willing to forego the surplus in T-2
if p < γ+2α
3α
. Again, once it is willing to forego the surplus in this period it
will also be willing to do so in all prior periods. Therefore, the period (T-n)
in which the stakeholder is first willing to forego the surplus will have both
of the following inequalities hold, p > (n−1)α+γ
nα
and p < γ+nα
(n+1)α
. This leads to
three testable predictions.
Hypothesis 1. Firms with more debt will receive better bargaining outcomes
In the health care sector in particular, there are a number of reasons
why insurance companies are concerned with a hospital’s leverage. First, insur-
ers want to satisfy their customers, and distress costs may reduce the quality
of care provided at a hospital. Second, excess debt may cause a hospital to
go bankrupt, which reduces the menu of options available for patients. Third,
bankruptcy can be equally problematic for insurers from a pure profit max-
imizing point of view because the consolidation in the hospital market may
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reduce the bargaining power of the insurance company with other hospitals as
the hospital concentration increases. These explanations imply that hospitals
with more debt should receive higher payments from insurers for performing
medical procedures. I test this prediction by estimating the following equation
for colonoscopy prices:
BargainingOutcomei,t = α + β1Leveragei,t + β2Xi,t + γt + εi,t (2.1)
The variable BargainingOutcome is the average annual reimbursement
rate for colonoscopies as described in detail in the data section. Leverage is the
book leverage of the hospital, Xi,t contains a variety of potentially time-varying
hospital and MSA controls, and γt is a set of year dummy variables. I include
hospital fixed effects in some specifications to account for time-invariant unob-
served hospital characteristics. A positive and significant β1 is evidence that
firms with higher leverage, ceteris paribus, receive better bargaining outcomes.
The impact of leverage on a firm’s bargaining power should vary with
the ex ante bargaining power the firm enjoys, i.e., its bargaining power in
the absence of leverage. A firm with relatively high ex ante bargaining power
in a relationship already obtains most of the surplus, even without the pre-
commitment effects of debt. At the extreme, a monopolist firm already receives
the entire surplus during negotiations and the use of debt conveys no addi-
tional bargaining benefits, whereas a firm with low bargaining power receives
a greater increase from the portion of the surplus that is removed. I now show
34
this more formally using the model. The effect of α on the sensitivity of bar-
gaining outcomes to leverage can be seen by examining the partial derivative
with respect to α of the difference of the payoffs for a firm with debt that
receives concessions compared to a firm without debt. In the two period setup
the second period payoffs are always the same so the difference comes from the
payoffs in the first period, (1 − γ) − c− (1 − α).12 The partial derivative with
respect to α is positive, which implies the sensitivity of bargaining outcomes
to leverage is increasing in the stakeholder’s bargaining power. This leads to
the second prediction.
Hypothesis 2. The effect of leverage on bargaining outcomes is stronger for
firms with lower ex ante bargaining power
Ideally, I would test this prediction by using a latent measure of ex
ante hospital bargaining power. Because, I cannot observe this latent measure
I split the sample based on different proxies of ex ante hospital bargaining
power, and estimate equation (2.1) separately for each subsample. If debt
is a more important factor in negotiations when ex ante hospital bargaining
power is low as I predict, then β1 should be larger for lower than higher ex
ante bargaining power subsamples. I implement this test using six measures
of ex ante bargaining power: whether or not the hospital is a member of a
system (System), the hospital’s local market share (MktShare), whether or
not the hospital is located in a MSA (Urban), the number of hospitals in
12In the T period framework this difference is going to depend on which period the
stakeholder is first willing to forego the surplus.
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the local market (NumHosp), the concentration in the local insurance mar-
ket (HHI Insurer) and whether or not there are state laws mandating equal
premiums on Medigap policies (Laws).
Although debt may be useful for committing a firm to a tough bar-
gaining position, the use of debt also exposes a firm to a number of potential
direct and indirect financial distress costs. Bargaining models contrast this
benefit with a variety of costs including: bankruptcy costs (Dasgupta and
Nanda (1993)), moral hazard problems (Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993)), and
underinvestment due to debt overhang (Perotti and Spier (1993) and Hen-
nessey and Livdan (2009)). Given these costs, a firm logically only uses debt
to gain bargaining power if the benefit is high or these costs are relatively low.
The costs and benefits of debt are captured by the marginal period
in which a firm finds it optimal to stop issuing debt. This period, n∗, is de-
termined in the model using the equation from above, p > (n−1)α+γ
nα
. The
solution is n∗ = α−γ
α(1−p) . Taking the partial derivative with respect to α leaves
γ
α2(1−p) , which is strictly positive. This result implies the number of periods
in which firms use strategic debt increases in their stakeholder’s ex ante bar-
gaining power. Thus, the final prediction that arises from the model suggests
a relation between a firm’s level of leverage and its ex ante bargaining power.
This relation has also been the focus of other similar research in alternative
settings.13
13See for example Matsa (2010) and Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Medina (2009), among
others
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Hypothesis 3. Firms use more strategic leverage when they have lower ex ante
bargaining power.
I test this prediction by estimating the following equation using the
same measures of ex ante bargaining power as regressors on which I split the
sample to test the second prediction:
Leveragei,t = α + β1BargainingPoweri,t + β2Xi,t + γt + εi,t (2.2)
2.3 Data
I use three main sources with data over the 2008-2012 sample period
to examine whether hospitals use debt to enhance their bargaining power dur-
ing negotiations with insurance companies.14 American Hospital Directory
(AHD) collects average reimbursement rates along with corporate, geographic
and financial data on hospitals that file Medicare claims reports. In addi-
tion, AHD obtains proprietary information on the system affiliation of each
hospital via a web scraper. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS)
publish the initial uncleaned claims reports and indices that are used to adjust
government payments.15 Finally, the American Medical Association (AMA)
publishes an annual report that includes information on market competition
14I use this time frame because the data is expensive, procedure classifications were
changed in 2007 and some data is only available a year later.
15An example of how AHD cleans these reports is eliminating excess reports when hos-
pitals file multiple times in one year.
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between insurance companies within certain MSAs. Figure 2.1 shows a map
of the United States, and the dark green sections indicate the MSAs for which
there is sufficient data to conduct the majority of the empirical analysis.
I combine different hospital specific data via their unique Medicare iden-
tifier and then combine this with metropolitan data via metropolitan codes.
There are approximately 6,000 hospitals in each of the five years, creating ap-
proximately 30,000 observations for the basic corporate and geographic vari-
ables. Of these, approximately one-third of the hospitals are general acute care
facilities and have the necessary pricing data.16 Finally, the insurance compe-
tition data is only available for the metropolitan areas, eliminating around 30%
or approximately 3,000 of the remaining observations. After requiring that hos-
pitals perform Medicare colonoscopies, report necessary financial data, and are
located in an MSA with insurance market competition measures, the sample
contains a total of 1,734 general acute care hospitals with 6,685 hospital-year
observations.17
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the variables included in the
empirical specifications. Leverage is the primary financial variable of interest
and is defined as total long-term liabilities scaled by a hospital’s total assets.18
16Other hospitals either refuse Medicare patients or include specialty hospitals such as a
cancer or psychiatric hospital.
17All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level to eliminate potential errors in
variables and ensure that regression results are not driven by outlier observations.
18I also use an alternative definition NetLeverage, which is total long-term liabilities
minus cash scaled by total assets. Hospitals on average hold about 5% of their assets in
cash as evidenced by the difference between Leverage and NetLeverage. All tables using
NetLeverage as the coefficient of interest can be found in the appendix.
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The average of 0.303 is very similar to the 0.261 found for the Compustat
firms by Matsa (2010) in his study of firm’s leverage using variation in right to
work laws. The standard deviation of 0.361 is quite a bit larger than the 0.164
in his sample largely because of the inclusion of nonprofit and government
hospitals. NonProfit, Profit, and Government are dummy variables based on
the hospital’s corporate classifications. Over 70% of the hospitals are not-for-
profit, and the remainder are split between for-profit (17.5%) and government
hospitals (12%). This variation in corporate structure is particularly useful
to disentangle the use of leverage for bargaining benefits versus interest tax
shields.
Because the profitability of these hospitals can mechanically affect their
leverage due to an increase in cash flows, I use net income scaled by total as-
sets, NetIncomeAssets. Capital structure theory posits that firms with greater
income volatility have incentives to reduce their leverage to minimize distress
costs.19 In order to control for this possibility, I use the net income scaled
by volatility, NetIncomeVol, defined as the standard deviation of annual net
income in millions of dollars across the five-year sample period. An additional
concern is that hospital investment can increase a hospital’s leverage while at
the same time increase their reimbursement rates due to nicer, newer facili-
ties. To help alleviate this concern, I control for CapEx, which is defined as
the annual difference in hospital assets.
19See Titman and Wessels (1988)
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Reimbursement rates for the procedure colonoscopy without biopsy
(APC code 158) are ideal to employ for this study because the procedure
is a straightforward, homogeneous, and frequently-performed operation for
Medicare enrollees around the country.20 The negotiation outcome, AvPay-
ment, is the average payment received for this procedure by the hospital for
all patients that are enrolled in Medicare including the base payment rate
as and adjustment factors, along with extra payments from co-payments, de-
ductibles, and third-party insurers.21 AvCost is the average annual hospital
cost of a colonoscopy, which I use as a control in the negotiation outcome
regressions and NumProcedures is the number of colonoscopies performed at
each hospital in a year. AvPayment and AvCost have similar means of around
$500, but the variation in AvCost is much higher.22 The average margin de-
fined as AvPayment minus AvCost per procedure is $36, which is a benchmark
I use to interpret the economic magnitude of the results.
In addition to publishing financial data on Medicare hospitals, CMS
publishes a number of other indices. Teaching is an indicator variable equal
20Complications and additional care are classified by an alternative code ensuring prices
are not due to differences in care. The base FFS rate for this procedure in 2008 was $500.02.
21FFS base reimbursement rates are determined for each procedure annually by a panel
of 29 physicians. These payments are then adjusted for the cost of living in an area and this
is the amount the government directly reimburses hospitals. Additional variation in aver-
age reimbursement rates are due to bargaining over supplemental payments and Medicare
Advantage patients.
22I would like to use a Nash bargaining model with negotiation outcomes as a function
of the cost and list price, but the high frequency in which costs are actually higher than
reimbursement rates precludes this test. One reason costs may frequently be higher than
payments is hospitals may differ in how they allocate fixed costs to procedures. Thus, I rely
on the average annual payment.
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to one if the hospital is associated with a university and I control for it in all
empirical tests.23 GeoAdjFactor is an index that is used to adjust base fee
schedules for the variation in costs of care arising from cost of living between
different metropolitan areas for FFS reimbursement rates.24 Given that I
am focusing on one specific procedure it is possible that differences in prices
could be due to differences in demographics. In particular, colonoscopies are
recommended for individuals starting at the age of 45 and hospitals in areas
with a greater population of older individuals could receive greater payments
per colonoscopy because there is greater demand. PctOver45 is the percent of
the population within each MSA that are over 45 as of the 2010 U.S. census.
Since hospitals consolidate via system affiliations in part to enhance
their market and bargaining power, the first proxy for low ex ante bargaining
power is if a hospital is a stand-alone facility. Around 25% of the hospitals in
my sample lack a partnership with other hospitals, and they are represented
by the indicator variable NoSystem. When calculating market share it is im-
portant to calculate their market power based on their system affiliation.25
MktShare is defined as the number of staffed beds within the system scaled by
the total number of staffed beds within the MSA.26 This measure of monop-
23Given the unique partnership structure the health care literature controls for a hos-
pital’s status in empirical work. I also do so to ensure these universities relationship with
hospitals does not affect their choice of leverage and the reimbursement rates they are able
to request.
24The exact calculation is two thirds of the fee scheduled scaled by the adjustment factor
plus one third of the unscaled base rate.
25Unfortunately, system affiliation is backfilled by AHD and I use their saved references
to correct changes in affiliation throughout the sample.
26This is the standard measure of market power used in the health care literature.
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sony power is the second measure I use for the ex ante bargaining power of a
hospital. Vast differences exist in the hospital markets as some are dominated
by a single system of hospitals and others consist of a dispersed group of hospi-
tals with smaller market shares. These differences can be observed in the fact
that the average MktShare is 22% and yet more than 10% of the hospitals have
a market share greater than 50%, while an equal amount have market shares
less than 2%.27 I split hospitals into two groups based on the median market
share within each MSA-year and smaller hospitals are the lower bargaining
power group.
The third measure of low bargaining power is if a hospital is located
outside a MSA. Approximately 30% of hospitals with sufficient financial data
are located outside MSAs and these areas tend to have only one insurer and
one hospital system, whereas bigger cities might have 30 hospitals and three
main insurers. The bilateral monopoly should lead to more bargaining power
for hospitals relative to urban areas where they are competing with more hospi-
tals and a similar number of insurers. The fourth measure of bargaining power
is based on the number of hospitals within a MSA. Hospitals have lower bar-
gaining power if there are above median number of hospitals within that year
(overall sample median of 9).28 Increased horizontal competition lowers the
bargaining power of hospitals. The fifth measure of ex ante hospital bargaining
power is based on the local market concentration of the insurance companies.
27This difference is not simply rural versus urban areas because all hospitals are located
in MSAs.
28Similar results can be found using the number of hospital systems as an alternative.
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A firm’s bargaining power is higher when dealing with dispersed stakeholders
because of the price pressure from the horizontal market. HHI Insurer is the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of insurance companies as reported in the annual
AMA reports for each metropolitan area. I classify low bargaining power hos-
pitals to be those located in a MSA with insurer concentration above 0.25.29
The sixth measure, Laws, is arguably the most exogenous from the
hospital’s perspective and it requires some explanation. Most FFS Medicare
enrollees purchase a supplemental Medigap policy to limit the potentially un-
limited out-of-pocket risk stemming from co-payments. While Medicare is
primarily for individuals 65 and older, approximately one in six enrollees is
a younger person eligible because of a disability or End-State Renal Disease
(ESRD).30 These individuals tend to require more care, are more expensive,
and therefore, without restriction insurance companies would charge them
more than older individuals for Medigap policies.31 However, 17 states require
insurance companies to price Medigap policies identically for enrollees without
regard to age.32
This mandated equality of premia effectively acts as a tax on the insur-
ance companies in their pricing of Medigap policies, which effectively transfers
29According to the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines published by the DOJ and FTC,
this is the cutoff for classification of extremely concentrated markets.
30http://www.medicareresources.org/basic-medicare-information/what-is-medicare/
31See CMS’s 2014 “Choosing a Medigap Policy” p.40.
32These states are: Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Maryland,
Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
South Dakota.
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part of the surplus from the hospital-insurer relationship to the younger more
expensive individuals, similar to precommiting part of the surplus to creditors.
The transfer increases the bargaining power of the insurance companies and
weakens the ex ante bargaining power of the hospital. Therefore, if hospitals
use debt to enhance bargaining power, the strategic benefits of debt in these
states should be greater and the hospitals should operate with more leverage
than those in other states, other things being equal. The orange states in
Figure 2.2 are the ones with these laws.
One potential concern with treating these differences in laws as exoge-
nous is that it imposes a geographical slant toward states in the Northeast. I
attribute this geographical difference to a propensity for public policies that
provide more for the disadvantaged in these states. Thus a concern arises with
using these laws as exogenous variation in ex ante bargaining power because
factors could be correlated with both hospital capital structure and negotiated
prices between hospitals and insurance companies, unrelated to the bargaining
benefits of leverage, that differ systematically across regions. However, It is
unclear and difficult to articulate what these differences might be and how
they would ultimately affects the results.33
Table 2.2 contains a cross-correlation matrix for the primary variables of
interest. The bargaining power measures have relatively low pairwise correla-
tion coefficients ranging from -0.2 to 0.45. There low correlations are beneficial
33I would like to do a matching exercise with these states, but unfortunately, the clus-
tering causes a problem similar states without these laws nearby.
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to the analysis for two reasons. First, the multiple proxies capture different
components of a latent bargaining power measure. Second, these are distinct
cuts of the data, which this shows the robust nature of the findings. The re-
maining variables have low correlations with one another with the exception of
two pairs. GeoAdjFactor has a correlation with AvPayment that is extremely
high, 0.756, because it is the primary factor to adjust for regional differences
in cost of care. The correlation between NumBeds and CapEx is 0.343 as this
is the primary investment that hospitals make.
In order to better understand the features of this unique setting I
present summary statistics for the variables measured at the MSA level for
years 2008, 2010, and 2012 in Table 2.3. MedianLev is the median hospital
leverage within each MSA and has declined from its peak in 2008 during the
financial crisis. MedianPay and MedianCost are defined as the median annual
payments and costs within each MSA and have each been increasing over the
sample period. I include year fixed effects in all regressions, which ensures
all of the identification comes within a year and helps eliminate spurious time
trends. The number of MSAs in the sample increases over time because the
AMA has included more areas in each edition of its studies.34 The distribu-
tion of corporate type and the number of hospitals is fairly constant over the
sample period.
Summary statistics for the sample by corporate type can be found in
34Results are robust to specifications requiring that each MSA be present for all studies.
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Table 2.4. For-profit hospitals are the smallest, have less-volatile earnings, are
more likely to be a part of the system, have lower leverage, have the lowest costs
and receive smaller payments. Nonprofit and government hospitals are similar
along most dimensions including size, costs, payments, income volatility, and
capital expenditures. Nonprofit hospitals have the highest leverage because
they issue more long-term debt. Government hospitals are more likely to be
located in rural areas.
Firm leverage and market competition measures tend to be sticky in
the short term which may affect the power of within firm tests given the
five-year sample. In order to test if this is a concern, Table 2.5 contains a
variance decomposition of Leverage, AvPayment, MktShare, NoSystem and
Insurer HHI by group (hospital, MSA, system affiliation, year, and state).
The results show how much of the variation for each variable is explained
by the differences within a group as opposed to between groups. The within
firm variation in leverage and average payments is one third to one half of
the variation across firms and this difference is even larger for the market
competition measures. The lack of within hospital variation limits the power
of fixed effects regressions that rely on within firm variation.35
35The lack of within firm variation for the market concentrations measures is unsurprising
and only limits the power of the leverage regressions.
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2.4 Results
The empirical analysis consists of four parts. I test each of the hy-
potheses developed in Section 2.2. First, I investigate whether hospitals with
more leverage receive higher reimbursement rates from insurers by estimating
equation (2.1). I then use the cross-sectional variation from this setting to test
if this effect is stronger when hospitals have weaker ex ante bargaining power.
Next, I use changes in capital structure and differences in corporate status’ to
rule out alternative non-bargaining explanations. Finally, I look for evidence
that hospitals are more apt to use debt to gain bargaining power when they
lack ex ante bargaining power by estimating equation (2.2).
2.4.1 Benefits of Leveragem
Table 2.6 presents a series of regressions based on equation (2.1) to
test the hypothesis that debt improves bargaining outcomes. The dependent
variable in each regression is a hospital’s average negotiated colonoscopy price
for the year. All specifications include year fixed effects and GeoAdjFactor,
Medicare’s geographical price adjustment, which has a major impact on price
variation across metropolitan areas. Standard errors are clustered at the hos-
pital level and Leverage is the variable of interest. Column 1 is the baseline
regression without additional controls. Column 2 contains other hospital con-
trols as described in Table 1 and Column 3 contains additional MSA controls.
Finally, Column 4 includes hospital fixed effects. Standard errors in this and
all later tables are shown in parentheses below the point estimates, and are
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clustered at the hospital level.36
In all specifications, the coefficient on leverage is positive, similar in
magnitude and statistically significant. This shows that firms with higher
leverage do in fact receive better negotiation outcomes. Using the coefficient
estimates in the fourth column with hospital fixed effects, a hospital with
a one standard deviation increase in leverage, ceteris paribus, receives $1.83
(=.361*5.057) more per procedure performed. Hospitals and insurance com-
panies effectively bargain over surplus - i.e., the value created after taking into
account the costs of performing a procedure. One back of the envelope way to
measures the magnitude is by examining the average hospital profit (payment
received minus cost) per colonoscopy performed, which is $36.07. Thus a $1.83
increase in payment received translates into approximately a 5% increase in
profit per procedure.
Moreover, the estimates of the impact of leverage on reimbursement
rates likely represent a lower bound on the average impact across all procedures
for two reasons. First, unlike most other procedures (e.g., heart surgeries),
colonoscopies are sufficiently straightforward that they can be performed at
outpatient clinics, which then compete with hospitals in performing them.
This competition drives prices down and limits the scope for bargaining for
these procedures.37 Also, variation is smaller for FFS Medicare patients be-
36The same results with NetLeverage as the independent variable of interest can be found
in Appendix table A.1.
37Hospital executives with whom I had conversations make this argument.
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cause the fee schedule and GeoAdjFactor are set by the panel of physicians,
limiting the portion of the procedure that is bargained over to supplemen-
tal payments, whereas they bargain over the entire reimbursement rates for
regular patients. In addition, the true economic magnitude for the hospital
would be determined by summing over each of the 7,000 procedures in which
hospitals and insurance companies negotiate reimbursement rates.
The coefficient on GeoAdjFactor is very large and has a t-statistic above
60 because it is the index used to adjust prices between MSAs. If I include
it as the only independent variable in this regression, it explains over 50% of
the variation in payments.38 There are still differences in cost that are not
being captured by this index, as is evident from the positive and statistically
significant coefficient on AvCost. In addition, teaching hospitals, hospitals
with more staffed beds and those that perform more procedures receive higher
average reimbursement rates, ceteris paribus.39,40
38Coefficients from these regressions are similar with alternative specifications including
scaling AvPayment by GeoAdjFactor, calculating a residual payment relative to the expected
local payment and including a squared GeoAdjFactor term. These results can be found in
Appendix table A.2.
39The coefficient on MktShare in the fourth column with hospital fixed effects is negative
and statistically significant, contrary to standard economic theory. Upon further exami-
nation, there are approximately 20 hospitals that were acquired by large systems and see
substantial changes in their MktShare. If I exclude these hospitals this relation no longer
exists. Further, the coefficient on Leverage actually increases, providing further robustness
that the main result is not driven by these outlier observations.
40Another concern with many of the hospitals being part of a large system of hospitals
is that hospital specific leverage may not be a good measure of financial constraint because
they may be able to receive capital from a hospital partner that has a stronger balance
sheet. To help rule this concern out I run all of the regressions at the hospital system level
with AvPayment, Leverage, MktShare, and AvCost measured on either an equal or value
weighted basis. In fact, the coefficients on Leverage are larger and can be found in Table
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Of course this result alone does not imply a causal interpretation that
debt improves bargaining power because there are a variety of reasons why
reimbursement rates and hospital leverage may be correlated. For example,
hospitals may use more debt to alleviate moral hazard problems and ensure
their executives exert higher effort during negotiations, which leads to better
bargaining outcomes. Alternatively, hospitals may issue debt and use the
proceeds to improve the quality of their facilities, which enables them to charge
higher rates. This is also consistent with reverse causality, where the firms
that are the best at negotiating are the most profitable and therefore, have
the greatest need for a debt tax shield.
In order to provide further evidence this result is due to bargaining
power as opposed to these other possibilities, I test the second prediction that
the bargaining benefits of leverage are larger when a hospital has lower ex ante
bargaining power. In order to test this, I split the hospitals between those
that have higher and lower ex ante bargaining power and estimate equation
(2.1) separately for each group. Specifically, I split the hospitals into two
groups using six different proxies: NoSystem, MktShare, Rural, NumHosp,
HHI Insurer, and Laws. Definitions of all of these proxies can be found in the
data section. Table 2.7 shows the cross sectional results from repeating the
regressions estimated in Table 2.5 with Leverage as the independent variable
of interest.41
A.3
41The corresponding table with NetLeverage as the independent variable of interest and
using hospital fixed effects can be found in Tables A.4 and A.5, respectively
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Each of the columns are paired with the high ex ante bargaining power
groups in the odd columns, while the low ex ante bargaining power groups
are in the even columns. Using all six proxies, the coefficients on Leverage
are only statistically significant different than 0 for hospitals with low ex ante
bargaining power and the magnitudes are two to five times higher for these
subsamples than those for the full sample in the previous table. Further, the
coefficients for the low ex ante bargaining power subsamples are statistically
different than the high ex ante bargaining power subsamples when the sample
is split on system status (p-value of 0.026), hospital market share (p-value of
0.009), and rural versus urban (p-value of 0.012).
In order to further examine the magnitude for these groups I plot the
coefficients for Leverage from the cross sectional regressions based on equation
(2.1) in Figure 2.3. The first black line shows the coefficient for the regression
based on all hospitals (Column 3 from Table 2.6). The remaining lines split
the hospitals based on the six measures of ex ante bargaining power, with the
red lines being the hospitals with lower bargaining power and the blue lines
being the counterparts with higher bargaining power (coefficients from Table
2.7). This figure helps to show magnitude difference in the bargaining benefits
of debt for the subset of hospitals that lack ex ante bargaining power.
These results bolster the interpretation that the leverage affects bar-
gaining power because there is no reason to believe this relationship is stronger
for hospitals that lack ex ante bargaining power if the effect was driven by man-
agerial effort, tax motives or an increase in capital expenditures. Of course
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there are several other concerns that need to be considered. In particular, one
concern is that price differences are not driven by bargaining and instead are
due to differences in care. The primary reason that I use a straightforward
homogeneous procedures with little clinical variation is to control for such con-
cerns. In addition, I control for the average hospital cost for these procedures
and the results hold in the presence of hospital fixed effects. Another concern
with using a sample during the financial crisis is that reimbursement rates
could have a mechanical relationship with the macro economy. The use of
year fixed effects in all regressions should account for the effects of any time
variation in aggregate prices with the identification coming from the cross
section.
It is possible that hospitals with lower bargaining power for the more
endogenous measures, like whether they are part of a system, may choose to
increase investment to improve their reimbursement rates rather than merging
with another hospital. I attempt to control for this possibility directly by
including CapEx in all pricing regressions regressions. To further rule out
this concern, I split the hospitals depending on if they had and increase long-
term liabilities, assets, neither or both from the previous year. Under the
investment alternative this effect should be driven entirely by the hospitals
that have increased both their long-term liabilities and assets or only increased
their total assets. These cross-sectional tests can be found in Table 2.8.42
42Corresponding tables using NetLeverage and hospital fixed effects can be found in
Tables A.6 and A.7, respectively.
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The coefficient on Leverage is only statistically significant in Columns 3
and 4 when long-term liabilities had increased from the previous year. Further,
the coefficient for the regression when only long-term liabilities increased is
larger than the column in which both liabilities and assets have increased.
These results do not support the notion that the results are driven by capital
expenditures instead of the bargaining hypothesis.
Another potential concern about the price-leverage relation arises from
tax-based motives for the use of debt. Taxes are among the most important
determinants of capital structure decisions. Tax motives could drive a pos-
itive relation between leverage and prices for two reasons. First, there may
be a reverse causality concern because, holding costs and volume fixed, higher
prices imply higher income, increasing the benefits of debt tax shields. Sec-
ond, manager skill may be an omitted variable in that more skilled hospital
managers might both be able to negotiate higher prices and choose to operate
with higher leverage in order to obtain more tax shields.
This concern is partially alleviated given the effect of leverage contin-
ues to hold with hospital fixed effects and further, there is no reason to expect
these tax based incentives would be stronger for the hospitals that lack ex ante
bargaining power. I bolster the evidence against this concern by exploiting a
unique feature of the health care industry, the presence of both for-profit and
nonprofit hospitals. For-profit hospitals pay federal and state corporate in-
come taxes, just as any other for-profit corporation does. Nonprofit hospitals,
on the other hand, are not subject to state or federal taxes. That being said,
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nonprofits can borrow at a cheaper rate because any debt they issue provides
abatement at the personal level. In addition, any debt issuance would non-
profits are subject to a “project financing rule,” which requires these hospitals
to issue debt only when they have the capital earmarked for a specific invest-
ment. While this could be useful under the alternative investment hypothesis,
nonprofits would have no way to take advantage of a traditional debt tax
shield. Therefore, if tax shields incentives drive the observed relation between
payments and leverage, this relation should only be observed among for-profit
hospitals.
I estimate equation (2.1) for subsamples consisting of for-profit and not-
for-profit hospitals separately, along with hospitals that switch from nonprofit
to for-profit hospitals during my sample. Table 2.9 presents the cross sectional
results.43
Column 1 shows the results in for-profit hospitals, Column 2 shows
the results for nonprofit hospitals and Column 3 shows hospitals that switch
during the sample. Contrary to tax motives driving the relation between pay-
ments and leverage, the relation actually holds only among nonprofit hospitals.
The relation between pricing and leverage in nonprofit hospitals is difficult to
reconcile with alternative explanations based on tax motives. The fact that
bargaining benefits only appear in nonprofit hospitals for the cross-sectional
tests brings up its own potential issues. The fact this relation does not exist
43The corresponding results using NetLeverage can be found in Table A.8, while results
using hospital fixed effects can be found in Table A.9.
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in for-profit hospitals may be because the number of for-profit hospitals in
my sample is relatively small, raising concerns about power. In addition, for-
profit hospitals are more likely to be in a large system of hospitals, which would
strengthen their ex ante bargaining power. With more bargaining power, the
bargaining benefits of debt are reduced and so these hospitals are also pre-
dicted to be less likely to use strategic leverage.
One way to examine the different incentives in for-profit and nonprofit
hospitals is to look when they switch corporate type. In my sample, there were
40 hospitals that switched between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, with all
of them switching to for-profit in some sort of merger. These nonprofit hospi-
tals had higher leverage ratios than other nonprofit hospitals before switching
corporate type and the use of debt increased after the merger, despite the total
debt in the sample decreasing over time. In some instances for-profit chains
were participating in a leveraged buyout of these nonprofit hospitals and so
one might expect the effect of leverage on negotiation outcomes to be stronger
in this subset. Column 3 shows the results and the coefficient on Leverage
cannot be distinguished from zero, though power is definitely an issue with
only 161 observations.
There are other differences worth noting between for-profit and non-
profit hospitals, specifically nonprofit hospitals have no equity holders. This
may reduce their profit maximizing motives or change their financial incentives
in other ways. There is extensive literature that suggests that nonprofit hos-
pitals act similarly to for-profit hospitals along a number of dimensions. After
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controlling for size and patient type, Wedig (1988) finds no difference in capital
structure by corporate type. Bowman (2002) finds nonprofit hospitals borrow
more when they receive endowments, consistent with optimizing leverage as
if they follow the trade-off theory of capital structure. Similarly, Wedig et al
(1996) model and find evidence that nonprofit hospitals issue debt until the
point that benefits are offset by agency and bankruptcy risk. Lastly, Duggan
(2002) uses responses to changes in regulation and finds nonprofit hospitals
respond similarly to for-profit hospitals. It is also worth noting that nonprofits
are legally required to provide free care to some patients, and thus are forced
to bargain aggressively with insured patients to ensure they make up for lost
resources and remain a going concern.44
2.4.2 Predicting Use of Leverage
The literature on the bargaining benefits from debt documents a rela-
tionship between leverage and unions. Recently, Matsa (2010) uses exogenous
variation in right to work laws to show firms tend to have higher leverage when
unions are strongest or in other words, the bargaining benefits are greater. I
seek confirmation of this result and test the third prediction in the health care
setting by testing whether hospitals with lower ex ante bargaining power, prox-
ied for by a lower market share, a lack of partnerships with other hospitals,
more competing hospitals, dealing with more concentrated insurers markets,
44This argument was made during an interview I had with an executive for a nonprofit
hospital.
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and operating in a state with laws on supplemental insurance policies, have
higher leverage.
Specifically, using equation (2.2), a positive coefficient on NegMktShare,
NoSystem, NumHosp, HHI Insurer, NoSystem and Laws would be consistent
with the prior literature and the third prediction. Results are shown in Table
2.10. All specifications include year fixed effects and standard errors clustered
at the hospital level. Leverage is the dependent variable. Column 1 contains
the baseline univariate regression, Column 2 includes additional controls and
Column 3 includes hospital fixed effects.45
In cross-sectional specifications, the coefficients of interest are positive
consistent with hospitals that have weaker ex ante bargaining power taking on
more leverage and the coefficients on NoSystem, Laws and NumHosp are all
statistically significant at the 1% level. Using the cross-sectional coefficients
from the second column with all of the controls, I find that, ceteris paribus, a
one standard deviation increase in the number of hospitals in the local market
would increase leverage by 0.031 (=20.9x0.0015) from a mean of 0.3. Ceteris
paribus, a partnership with other hospitals has 0.06 lower leverage than a
stand-alone hospital. Finally, a hospital in states without pooling laws tend to
have .063 lower leverage than hospitals in states without these laws. Each of
these results is consistent with hospitals using more leverage when they lack
ex ante bargaining power.
45The corresponding Table using NetLeverage can be found in Table A.10.
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In the final column with hospital fixed effects the only measure of bar-
gaining power that is statistically significant is NegMktShare and the coeffi-
cient is actually larger. SamePremium is omitted because the laws are not
time-varying from 2008-2012. NoSystem and HHI Insurer continue to be the
weakest variables in specifications with hospital fixed effects because there is
relatively little variation in the time series.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I use a novel setting, the health care industry, to test the
bargaining benefits from debt during negotiations with a firm’s non-financial
stakeholders. In testing this theory, existing empirical evidence has relied on
indirect evidence that leverage is higher when negotiating with strong stake-
holders, for example unions. There is a lack of direct evidence that lever-
age effects negotiation outcomes because negotiation outcomes are rarely ob-
served, especially for a broad cross-section of firms. I find that hospitals with
more leverage receive higher reimbursement rates for a homogeneous procedure
(colonoscopies) and this is the first direct evidence that firms receive better
bargaining outcomes when they have higher leverage.
Given that there are costs associated with debt, trade-off theory pre-
dicts that leverage is more likely to be used to enhance bargaining power when
the benefits are greatest, specifically when a firm otherwise lacks bargaining
power. Consistent with this notion, I find negotiation outcomes are more sen-
sitive to leverage for subsets of hospitals that have lower ex ante bargaining
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power; stand-alone hospitals, those with a below-median market share, urban
hospitals, those that operate in markets with above median hospitals, hospi-
tals that operate in a market with an insurer HHI above 0.25 and if hospitals
are located in states with Medigap pooling laws.
These results help to rule out alternative capital expenditure or tax-
based explanations for this effect. In order to further rule out a capital expen-
diture explanation, I show the coefficient on leverage continues to be significant
despite no increase in hospital assets. Further, I show the bargaining bene-
fits from debt exist for nonprofit hospitals, which helps to alleviate concerns
that the relationship between leverage and bargaining outcomes is driven by
tax motives. Lastly, I confirm capital structure decisions of these hospitals
are consistent with the prior literature by showing leverage is decreasing in a
firm’s ex ante bargaining power. I find hospital leverage is negatively related
to a hospital’s market share, lower when the hospital is a member of a sys-
tem, higher if they compete against more hospitals and higher if they are in a
state with pooling insurance premium requirements. I conclude this is direct
support for the bargaining benefits of debt during negotiations with a firm’s
non-financial stakeholders.
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Table 1.1: Hospital Assets
This table contains the total hospital assets in the U.S. by corporate type from 1947
until 1977.
Year Nonprofit Government For profit Total
1947 2697 612 129 3439
1950 3350 861 138 4349
1955 5223 1614 148 6985
1960 8422 2193 243 10858
1965 12476 3474 414 16364
1970 20502 5301 871 26674
1975 35827 8890 2538 47256
1977 46686 10953 3494 61133
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Table 1.2: Hospitals by Corporate Type
This table contains the total number of hospitals and corresponding percentage by corporate type from 1946 until
2009 in the U.S..
Year Total Nonprofit For Profit Government % Nonprofit % Profit % Govt
1946 4445 2584 1076 785 58.13% 24.21% 17.66%
1950 5031 2871 1218 942 57.07% 24.21% 18.72%
1955 5237 3097 1020 1120 59.14% 19.48% 21.39%
1960 5407 3291 856 1260 60.87% 15.83% 23.30%
1965 5736 3426 857 1453 59.73% 14.94% 25.33%
1975 5875 3339 775 1761 56.83% 13.19% 29.97%
1980 5830 3322 730 1778 56.98% 12.52% 30.50%
1990 5834 3191 749 1444 54.70% 12.84% 24.75%
1995 5194 3092 752 1350 59.53% 14.48% 25.99%
2000 4915 3003 749 1163 61.10% 15.24% 23.66%
2009 5008 2918 998 1092 58.27% 19.93% 21.81%
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Table 1.3: Insurance Coverage
This table contains the U.S. population, percent covered by insur-
ance, and percent covered by Blue Cross by year from 1940 until
1986.
Year Population % Insurance % BC
1940 132.5 9 50.3
1945 133.4 24 58.9
1950 152.3 50.3 50.7
1955 165.9 61.1 50
1960 180.7 67.8 47.4
1965 194.3 71.4 45.7
1970 205.1 77.5 47.2
1975 216 82.5 48.5
1980 227.8 82.3 46.3
1986 241.6 74.4 43.4
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Table 1.4: System vs Independent Hospitals
This shows the number of independent and system-based hospitals
between 1999 and 2010 as reported in the Dixon Hughes Goodman
2013 Winter Healthcare report.














Table 1.5: Funding Source
This table shows the funding source for nonprofit hospitals between
1968 and 1981.
Funding Source 1968 1973 1978 1981
Philanthropy 21 10 6 4
Govt 23 21 16 12
Internal Reserves 16 15 17 15
Debt 38 54 61 69
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Table 1.6: Summary Stats by Corporate Type 2012
This table contains the summary statistics for the relevant variables at the MSA level. Panel A contains summary
statistics from 2008, B from 2010, and C from 2012. PctProfit is equal to the percentage of all hospitals that are
for-profit hospitals, PctNonprofit is equal to the percent of hospitals that are nonprofit, and PctGovt is the percent
of hospitals that are government hospitals. MedianPay is the median reimbursement rate that hospitals receive in
the MSA. MedianCost is the median cost that hospitals pay for colonoscopies in the MSA. MedianLev is the median
leverage of each hospital in the respective MSA. HHI Insurer is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for both HMO and
PPO insurance participation published by the American Medical Association.
A: Profit count mean p50 sd p10 p90
Leverage 437 0.113 0.032 0.605 -1.009 0.892
HHI Insurer 313 0.300 0.266 0.121 0.198 0.433
CapEx 437 7.415 2.444 34.311 -7.290 32.992
Total Staffed Beds 437 179.201 139.000 154.447 39.000 373.000
MktShare 437 0.273 0.150 0.315 0.010 1.000
NetIncomeVol 437 6.983 3.819 9.025 0.947 15.358
Teaching 437 0.160 0.000 0.367 0.000 1.000
HHI Hospital 437 0.320 0.228 0.296 0.045 1.000
NoSystem 437 0.142 0.000 0.349 0.000 1.000
NetIncomeAssets 437 0.088 0.091 0.858 -0.095 0.440
B: Nonprofit count mean p50 sd p10 p90
Leverage 1432 0.320 0.299 0.273 0.004 0.652
HHI Insurer 1070 0.287 0.262 0.096 0.194 0.396
CapEx 1432 14.945 5.101 42.576 -12.811 57.529
Total Staffed Beds 1432 262.622 196.500 229.924 60.000 543.000
MktShare 1432 0.328 0.203 0.331 0.011 1.000
NetIncomeVol 1432 13.285 6.750 16.103 1.630 35.211
Teaching 1432 0.326 0.000 0.469 0.000 1.000
HHI Hospital 1432 0.330 0.218 0.311 0.045 1.000
NoSystem 1432 0.290 0.000 0.454 0.000 1.000
NetIncomeAssets 1432 1535.525 0.045 58103.693 -0.046 0.146
C: Government count mean p50 sd p10 p90
Leverage 328 0.282 0.257 0.228 0.003 0.604
HHI Insurer 178 0.315 0.264 0.147 0.194 0.470
CapEx 328 17.370 2.925 47.519 -5.347 81.254
Total Staffed Beds 328 233.259 153.000 229.974 47.000 572.000
MktShare 328 0.419 0.284 0.398 0.002 1.000
NetIncomeVol 328 10.750 3.574 16.294 0.816 30.296
Teaching 328 0.241 0.000 0.428 0.000 1.000
HHI Hospital 328 0.428 0.296 0.367 0.004 1.000
NoSystem 328 0.668 1.000 0.472 0.000 1.000
NetIncomeAssets 328 0.025 0.023 0.098 -0.047 0.097
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Table 1.7: Summary Stats by System 2012
This table contains the summary statistics for the relevant variables at the system level. Panel A contains summary
statistics from stand-alone hospitals and B for hospitals part of a system. All variable definitions can be found in 2.1
A: Stand-alone count mean p50 sd p10 p90
Leverage 696 0.327 0.310 0.218 0.057 0.610
HHI Insurer 390 0.303 0.266 0.117 0.201 0.445
CapEx 696 9.737 2.540 27.809 -6.901 32.199
Total Staffed Beds 696 183.167 133.000 158.349 44.000 414.000
MktShare 696 0.341 0.101 0.398 0.002 1.000
NetIncomeVol 696 8.022 3.403 12.053 0.835 21.859
Teaching 696 0.185 0.000 0.389 0.000 1.000
HHI Hospital 696 0.402 0.272 0.359 0.004 1.000
NetIncomeAssets 696 0.033 0.029 0.177 -0.047 0.111
B: System count mean p50 sd p10 p90
Leverage 1501 0.248 0.245 0.418 0.000 0.722
HHI Insurer 1171 0.290 0.262 0.105 0.194 0.410
CapEx 1501 15.697 5.163 47.012 -13.028 63.609
Total Staffed Beds 1501 268.761 197.000 237.755 61.000 561.000
MktShare 1501 0.326 0.214 0.312 0.024 0.958
NetIncomeVol 1501 13.337 6.876 16.178 1.760 35.450
Teaching 1501 0.324 0.000 0.468 0.000 1.000
HHI Hospital 1501 0.315 0.216 0.295 0.045 0.919
NetIncomeAssets 1501 1464.953 0.054 56752.487 -0.060 0.228
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Table 2.1: Summary Stats
This table contains the summary statistics for the relevant variables. Leverage is the book value of leverage for the
hospital defined as total long term liabilities scaled by total assets. NetIncomeAssets is the annual net income of
the hospital scaled by total assets. PctOver45 is the percent of people in the local MSA that are age 45 and older
as reported in the 2010 census. NumBeds is the number of staffed beds within the hospital, a common measure of
hospital size. MktShare is the total number of staffed beds within the system MSA scaled by the total number of beds
within the MSA. NoSystem is an indicator variable equal to one if the hospital is not part of a hospital system and zero
otherwise. HHI Insurer is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for both HMO and PPO insurance participation published
by the American Medical Association. NonProfit is an indicator variable equal to one if it is equal to one if it is an
accredited teaching hospital. Profit is an indicator variable equal to one if the hospital is a for-profit corporation.
Government is a dummy variable equal to one if the hospital is a government hospital. CapEx is the different in total
assets from the previous year. NetIncomeVol is the annual hospital volatility of net income in millions. Teaching is
an indicator variable equal to one if the hospital is a teaching hospital. AvPayment is the average annual payments
received from all parties for colonoscopies performed on Medicare patients. AvCost is the average annual cost reported
by the hospital for colonoscopies past year. NumProcedures is the number of colonoscopies performed by the hospital
in that year. GeoAdjFactor is the adjustment published by the centers for Medicare and Medicaid to adjust payments
for differences in cost of living. NumHosp is the number of hospitals in the MSA that year. Laws is an indicator if
the hospital is located in states that have pooling Medigap restrictions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the
1% level.
count mean p50 sd p10 p90
Leverage 6685 0.303 0.303 0.361 0.000 0.693
NetIncomeAssets 6685 0.128 0.040 4.043 -0.059 0.186
PctOver45 6685 39.39 39.90 4.93 32.80 44.90
NumBeds 6685 298.03 233.00 250.73 68.00 602.00
NonProfit 6685 0.704 1.000 0.456 0.000 1.000
Profit 6685 0.174 0.000 0.379 0.000 1.000
Government 6685 0.122 0.000 0.327 0.000 1.000
CapEx 6685 14.515 3.197 31.58 -11.59 65.00
NetIncomeVol 6685 14.49 7.92 16.59 1.96 37.88
Teaching 6685 0.369 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000
AvPayment 6685 515.19 509.20 56.73 446.92 596.16
AvCost 6685 479.12 431.13 223.87 238.39 791.33
NumProcedures 6685 87.26 51.00 106.83 16.00 197.00
NoSystem 6685 0.248 0.000 0.432 0.000 1.000
MktShare 6685 0.226 0.155 0.230 0.016 0.537
HHI Insurer 6685 0.315 0.277 0.131 0.201 0.469
GeoAdjFactor 6685 1.001 0.964 0.115 0.891 1.195
NumHosp 6685 17.007 9.000 20.899 2.000 58.000

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Summary Stats by MSA
This table contains the summary statistics for the relevant variables at the MSA level. Panel A contains summary
statistics from 2008, B from 2010, and C from 2012. PctProfit is equal to the percentage of all hospitals that are
for-profit hospitals, PctNonprofit is equal to the percent of hospitals that are nonprofit, and PctGovt is the percent
of hospitals that are government hospitals. MedianPay is the median reimbursement rate that hospitals receive in
the MSA. MedianCost is the median cost that hospitals pay for colonoscopies in the MSA. MedianLev is the median
leverage of each hospital in the respective MSA. HHI Insurer is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for both HMO and
PPO insurance participation published by the American Medical Association.
Panel A: 2008 count mean p50 sd p10 p90
HHI Insurer 274 0.382 0.339 0.162 0.218 0.606
MedianPayment 274 465.46 454.45 44.33 422.43 518.07
MedianCost 274 413.85 386.39 151.48 246.93 612.57
MedianLev 274 0.203 0.199 0.176 0.006 0.420
TotalHospitals 274 10.71 5.000 16.98 2.000 26.00
PctGovt 274 0.204 0.101 0.274 0.000 0.646
PctProfit 274 0.161 0.084 0.209 0.000 0.436
PctNonProfit 274 0.635 0.731 0.325 0.000 1.000
Panel B: 2010 count mean p50 sd p10 p90
HHI Insurer 301 0.333 0.303 0.140 0.202 0.506
MedianPayment 301 503.09 492.04 48.25 454.47 564.86
MedianCost 301 441.86 416.83 160.58 271.80 656.79
MedianLev 301 0.221 0.203 0.191 0.002 0.451
TotalHospitals 301 11.46 6.000 18.08 2.000 28.00
PctGovt 301 0.189 0.090 0.260 0.000 0.592
PctProfit 301 0.171 0.105 0.200 0.000 0.435
PctNonProfit 301 0.640 0.723 0.318 0.040 1.000
Panel C: 2012 count mean p50 sd p10 p90
HHI Insurer 312 0.347 0.316 0.217 0.204 0.523
MedianPayment 312 534.11 522.83 58.67 475.73 609.87
MedianCost 312 467.12 441.56 170.25 280.00 685.07
MedianLev 312 0.176 0.176 0.193 0.000 0.409
TotalHospitals 312 11.33 6.000 17.90 2.000 27.00
PctGovt 312 0.188 0.080 0.258 0.000 0.614
PctProfit 312 0.186 0.107 0.214 0.000 0.478
PctNonProfit 312 0.626 0.691 0.320 0.034 1.000
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Table 2.4: Summary Stats by Corporate Type
This table contains the summary statistics for the relevant variables by corporate type. Panel A contains summary
statistics by for-profit hospitals, B from nonprofit hospitals, and C from government hospitals. AvCost is the average
annual cost reported by the hospital for colonoscopies past year. Leverage is the book value of leverage for the hospital
defined as total long term liabilities scaled by total assets. HHI Insurer is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for both
HMO and PPO insurance participation published by the American Medical Association. CapEx is the different in
total assets from the previous year. Total Staffed Beds is the number of beds at the hospital that can be used for
patients. MktShare is the total number of staffed beds within the system MSA scaled by the total number of beds
within the MSA. NetIncomeVol is the annual hospital volatility of net income in millions. Teaching is an indicator
variable equal to one if the hospital is a teaching hospital. NumProcedures is the number of colonoscopies performed
by the hospital in that year. AvPayment is the average annual payments received from all parties for colonoscopies
performed on Medicare patients. NoSystem is an indicator equal to one if it is a stand-alone hospital. All continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1% level.
A: Profit count mean p50 sd p10 p90
AvCost 1160 399.256 363.640 191.998 190.346 637.912
Leverage 1160 0.160 0.104 0.605 -1.009 0.925
HHI Insurer 1160 0.321 0.273 0.163 0.201 0.483
CapEx 1160 3.495 0.000 18.078 -7.712 17.569
Total Staffed Beds 1160 198.505 169.000 166.651 32.000 400.500
MktShare 1160 0.164 0.100 0.166 0.010 0.374
NetIncomeVol 1160 7.710 5.222 8.798 1.316 16.061
Teaching 1160 0.172 0.000 0.378 0.000 1.000
NumProcedures 1160 54.978 33.000 69.946 14.000 119.500
AvPayment 1160 501.280 497.499 52.094 438.544 567.618
NoSystem 1160 0.151 0.000 0.358 0.000 1.000
B: Nonprofit count mean p50 sd p10 p90
AvCost 4709 496.895 446.964 227.387 252.904 824.842
Leverage 4709 0.342 0.327 0.281 0.006 0.674
HHI Insurer 4709 0.308 0.277 0.113 0.202 0.454
CapEx 4709 16.470 5.266 32.857 -13.516 71.197
Total Staffed Beds 4709 316.318 248.000 259.566 86.000 631.000
MktShare 4709 0.235 0.169 0.233 0.018 0.540
NetIncomeVol 4709 15.784 8.997 17.189 2.327 42.018
Teaching 4709 0.406 0.000 0.491 0.000 1.000
NumProcedures 4709 96.958 57.000 117.379 17.000 216.000
AvPayment 4709 520.445 514.250 57.097 450.826 602.958
NoSystem 4709 0.220 0.000 0.414 0.000 1.000
C: Government count mean p50 sd p10 p90
AvCost 816 490.113 445.480 221.144 264.231 784.924
Leverage 816 0.279 0.270 0.240 0.000 0.568
HHI Insurer 816 0.347 0.294 0.169 0.201 0.582
CapEx 816 18.899 3.989 35.555 -10.212 100.490
Total Staffed Beds 816 334.001 269.000 263.736 61.000 684.000
MktShare 816 0.262 0.132 0.273 0.017 0.682
NetIncomeVol 816 16.631 8.453 19.022 1.331 45.821
Teaching 816 0.431 0.000 0.496 0.000 1.000
NumProcedures 816 77.194 52.500 70.150 15.000 168.000
AvPayment 816 504.667 498.529 56.142 435.912 581.387
NoSystem 816 0.549 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000
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Table 2.5: Variance Decomposition
This table contains the Variance Decomposition of Leverage, AvPayment, MktShare, HHI Insurer and
NoSystem. The first two rows show the overall mean and standard deviation while the subsequent rows
split the variation by between group and within group. The groups are Hospitals, Metropolitan Statistical
Areas, Years, System Affiliations, and States.
Variable Leverage AvPayment MktShare Insurer HHI NoSystem
Overall Mean 0.303 515.2 0.226 0.315 0.248
Overall S.D. 0.361 56.7 0.23 0.13 0.432
Between Hospital 0.361 51.8 0.225 0.12 0.427
Within Hospital 0.13 27.5 0.031 0.054 0.026
Between MSA 0.22 45.5 0.266 0.137 0.323
Within MSA 0.323 33.5 0.121 0.056 0.378
Between Year 0.013 26.7 0.007 0.023 0.006
Within Year 0.361 51.6 0.23 0.129 0.432
Between System 0.134 37.6 0.042 0.036 NA
Within System 0.361 56.4 0.229 0.13 NA
Between State 0.142 39.6 0.126 0.094 0.138
Within State 0.344 39.8 0.214 0.092 0.423
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Table 2.6: Payment on Leverage
This table contains regressions with AvPayment as the dependent variable with Leverage as the independent
variables of interest. All columns contain year fixed effects and GeoAdjFactor with standard errors clustered
at the hospital level. Column two contains additional hospital controls, while column three contains MSA
controls. Column four includes hospital fixed effects. All variable definitions are in Table 2.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AvPayment AvPayment AvPayment AvPayment
Leverage 4.169*** 3.033** 2.791* 5.057**
(2.82) (2.03) (1.85) (2.49)
GeoAdjFactor 369.3*** 361.9*** 362.6***
(70.08) (65.77) (64.98)
NoSystem 1.701 1.573 -8.854
(1.12) (1.04) (-1.09)
AvCost 0.0119*** 0.0113*** 0.0200***
(4.73) (4.42) (5.71)
CapEx 0.0144 0.0151 0.00723
(1.08) (1.13) (0.73)
NonProfit 2.080 1.914 -3.032
(1.13) (1.02) (-0.66)
NetIncomeAssets 0.00177 0.00578 0.0141
(0.05) (0.16) (0.95)
NumBeds 0.00293 0.00279 0.00451**
(1.18) (1.13) (2.47)
Profit -0.387 -0.489 0.600
(-0.17) (-0.21) (0.12)
MktShare 2.782 2.127 -24.08***
(0.99) (0.76) (-3.00)








HHI Insurer 4.657 -6.180*
(1.19) (-1.69)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE No No No Yes
N 6685 6685 6685 6685


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: Subsample Based on Increase in Assets/Liabilities
This table contains regressions with average payment as the dependent variable. All regressions include year
fixed effects, controls and standard errors clustered at the state level. Column 1 contains hospitals that did
not increase assets or long-term liabilities from the previous year. Column 2 contains hospitals that had an
increase in assets with no increase in liabilities. Column 3 contains hospitals that increase liabilities with
no increase in assets and Column 4 contains an increase in both assets and liabilities.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NoIncrease AssetIncrease LiabIncrease BothIncrease
Leverage 0.233 2.643 6.333* 5.108*
(0.12) (1.02) (1.88) (1.87)
NoSystem -1.153 1.641 6.105** 2.145
(-0.51) (0.84) (2.11) (1.03)
AvCost 0.0130*** 0.00731** 0.00547 0.0167***
(2.96) (2.06) (1.04) (4.83)
CapEx 0.0290 -0.00157 -0.0667 0.00962
(0.36) (-0.06) (-0.51) (0.45)
NonProfit 4.483 2.046 0.901 -0.580
(1.64) (0.86) (0.26) (-0.20)
NetIncomeAssets -0.0117 -0.0158 2.872 0.860
(-0.05) (-1.18) (0.59) (0.40)
PctOver45 -0.000889 0.173 -0.0368 0.355**
(-0.01) (1.18) (-0.14) (1.99)
NumBeds 0.00212 0.00311 0.00478 0.00341
(0.76) (0.88) (0.83) (0.82)
Profit -1.563 2.128 -6.376 -1.321
(-0.47) (0.69) (-1.42) (-0.36)
GeoAdjFactor 358.8*** 370.8*** 337.3*** 381.0***
(40.97) (46.26) (27.50) (49.93)
HHI Insurer 8.734 5.325 -7.276 6.832
(1.56) (1.01) (-0.76) (1.03)
MktShare 0.725 -2.460 -4.574 8.972**
(0.16) (-0.67) (-0.73) (2.37)
NumProcedures 0.00860 0.0173** 0.00770 0.0101*
(0.93) (2.29) (0.90) (1.68)
Teaching 3.682* 0.258 3.233 2.642
(1.84) (0.14) (1.22) (1.38)
NetIncomeVol -0.148** -0.0421 -0.112 -0.0849
(-2.14) (-0.75) (-1.55) (-1.52)
N 1564 2170 797 2154
adj. R2 0.725 0.745 0.710 0.766
t statistics in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 2.9: Payment on Leverage by Corporate Type
This table contains cross sectional regressions with AvPayment as the dependent variable
for subsets of hospitals based on their corporate status. Column 1 contains the subset
of for-profit hospitals, Column 2 contains nonprofit hospitals and Column 3 contains the
hospitals that switched from nonprofit to for-profit during my sample.
(1) (2) (3)
Profit NonProfit Switchers
Leverage -0.0480 4.588** 0.472
(-0.02) (2.08) (0.07)
AvCost 0.0170** 0.0103*** 0.00148
(2.58) (3.46) (0.15)
CapEx 0.00937 0.0106 0.0793
(0.20) (0.68) (1.09)
NoSystem 5.778 0.215 3.403
(1.51) (0.12) (0.30)
NetIncomeAssets 1.369 0.000174 0.00771
(0.60) (0.01) (0.01)
PctOver45 -0.0837 0.350** 1.950**
(-0.33) (2.50) (2.53)
NumBeds -0.000369 0.00288 -0.00904
(-0.04) (1.04) (-0.35)
GeoAdjFactor 391.7*** 362.8*** 389.9***
(26.91) (54.82) (16.47)
HHI Insurer 6.687 7.175 29.03
(0.97) (1.26) (0.93)
MktShare 8.956 -1.079 -29.49**
(1.04) (-0.32) (-2.04)
NumProcedures 0.0144 0.0114** -0.0111
(1.15) (2.13) (-0.38)
Teaching 5.711* 1.363 3.241
(1.75) (0.87) (0.54)
NetIncomeVol -0.196 -0.0710 -0.0253
(-0.97) (-1.54) (-0.07)
N 1160 4709 161
adj. R2 0.675 0.754 0.878
t statistics in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table 2.10: Leverage on Bargaining Power
This table contains regressions with hospital leverage as the dependent variable. All re-
gressions include year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the hospital level. The
first column contains the five variables of interest NegMktShare, NumHosp, HHI Insurer,
NoSystem, and Laws. The second column contain other MSA level controls and hospital
controls, and the final column contains hospital fixed effects. Variable definitions can be
found in Table 2.1.
(1) (2) (3)
Leverage Leverage Leverage




NegMktShare 0.00469 0.0497 0.160*
(0.13) (1.38) (1.75)
NumHosp 0.00145*** 0.00108** -0.000249
(3.38) (2.46) (-0.28)




















Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
N 6685 6685 6685
adj. R2 0.039 0.071 0.013
t statistics in parentheses



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.1 Payment on Net Leverage
A.2 Alternate GeoAdjFactor Scaling
A.3 System Weighted Average Payment
A.4 Cross-sectional Tests of NetLeverage on Bargaining Power Proxies
A.5 Fixed Effects Tests of Leverage Split on Bargaining Power Proxies
A.6 Subsample Based on Increase in Assets/Liabilities NetLeverage
A.7 Subsample Based on Increase in Assets/Liabilities Fixed Effects
A.8 Payment on Net Leverage by Corporate Type
A.9 Payment on Leverage by Corporate Type with Fixed Effects
A.10 Net Leverage on Bargaining Power
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Table A.1: Payment on Net Leverage
This table contains regressions with AvPayment as the dependent variable with NetLeverage
as the independent variables of interest. All columns contain year fixed effects and GeoAdj-
Factor with standard errors clustered at the hospital level. Column two contains additional
hospital controls, while column three contains MSA controls. Column four includes hospital
fixed effects. All variable definitions are in Table 2.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AvPayment AvPayment AvPayment AvPayment
NetLeverage 3.477** 2.414* 2.191 4.022**
(2.47) (1.70) (1.53) (2.23)
GeoAdjFactor 375.2*** 367.5*** 368.5***
(70.75) (66.15) (65.35)
NoSystem 1.905 1.754 -9.036
(1.27) (1.17) (-1.13)
AvCost 0.0121*** 0.0114*** 0.0200***
(4.82) (4.49) (5.71)
CapEx 0.0115 0.0122 0.00734
(0.86) (0.92) (0.74)
NonProfit 2.403 2.252 -3.179
(1.30) (1.20) (-0.69)
NetIncomeAssets 0.00809 0.0116 0.0271
(0.22) (0.32) (1.54)
NumBeds 0.00317 0.00305 0.00452**
(1.29) (1.24) (2.47)
Profit -0.467 -0.552 0.471
(-0.20) (-0.24) (0.09)
MktShare 2.448 1.692 -24.28***
(0.87) (0.60) (-3.02)








HHI Insurer 5.780 -6.204*
(1.46) (-1.69)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE No No No Yes
N 6685 6685 6685 6685
adj. R2 0.742 0.746 0.746 0.653
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Table A.2: Alternate GeoAdjFactor Scaling
This table contains additional cross sectional regressions with various alternative mea-
sures of AvPayment on the LHS and alternative specifications for the GeoAdjFactor.
Geo2 is GeoAdjFactor squared. DiffPay is the difference between observed payments
and a predicted payment if all patients were FFS Medicare patients using the base rate




Leverage 3.045** 2.633* 2.834*
(2.04) (1.69) (1.88)
NoSystem 1.618 2.085 1.922
(1.08) (1.40) (1.28)
AvCost 0.0140*** 0.0114*** 0.0118***
(5.74) (4.69) (4.73)
CapEx 0.0145 0.00729 0.0113
(1.08) (0.56) (0.85)
NonProfit 2.919 2.322 2.213
(1.56) (1.22) (1.19)
NetIncomeAssets -0.00463 0.00215 -0.000246
(-0.13) (0.06) (-0.01)
NumBeds 0.00320 0.00280 0.00333
(1.28) (1.14) (1.35)
Profit -0.447 -0.605 -0.424
(-0.19) (-0.26) (-0.18)
HHI Insurer 2.676 8.820** 7.571*
(0.70) (2.10) (1.89)
MktShare 0.172 4.149 3.249
(0.06) (1.42) (1.13)
NumProcedures 0.0124** 0.0114** 0.0110**
(2.55) (2.36) (2.29)
Teaching 2.159 1.720 1.865
(1.59) (1.29) (1.36)






N 6685 6685 6685
adj. R2 0.122 0.486 0.749
t statistics in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table A.3: System Weighted Average Payment
This table contains regressions with equal and value weighted pay-
ments by system are used as the dependent variable with independent
variables either measured at the market level or by corresponding
equal and value weighted measures. EWLev and VWLev are lever-
age equal weighted and value weighted, respectively. EWCost and
VWCost are cost equal weighted and value weighted, respectively.

























adj. R2 0.767 0.768
t statistics in parentheses



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.6: Subsample Based on Increase in Assets/Liabilities NetLeverage
This table contains regressions with average payment as the dependent variable. All regressions include year
fixed effects, controls and standard errors clustered at the state level. Column 1 contains hospitals that did
not increase assets or long-term liabilities from the previous year. Column 2 contains hospitals that had an
increase in assets with no increase in liabilities. Column 3 contains hospitals that increase liabilities with
no increase in assets and Column 4 contains an increase in both assets and liabilities.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NoIncrease AssetIncrease LiabIncrease BothIncrease
NetLeverage -0.302 2.398 5.296 4.647*
(-0.16) (0.98) (1.64) (1.74)
NoSystem -1.129 1.691 6.154** 2.237
(-0.50) (0.87) (2.13) (1.07)
AvCost 0.0130*** 0.00734** 0.00553 0.0168***
(2.98) (2.07) (1.05) (4.84)
CapEx 0.0274 -0.00206 -0.0658 0.00904
(0.34) (-0.07) (-0.51) (0.42)
NonProfit 4.517* 2.075 0.939 -0.556
(1.65) (0.87) (0.27) (-0.19)
NetIncomeAssets -0.0164 -0.00776 2.437 0.833
(-0.07) (-0.50) (0.50) (0.39)
PctOver45 0.00116 0.177 -0.0403 0.358**
(0.01) (1.21) (-0.16) (2.01)
NumBeds 0.00209 0.00303 0.00461 0.00330
(0.75) (0.86) (0.80) (0.79)
Profit -1.652 2.031 -6.548 -1.448
(-0.50) (0.66) (-1.46) (-0.39)
GeoAdjFactor 358.9*** 370.8*** 337.6*** 381.0***
(41.02) (46.20) (27.48) (49.88)
HHI Insurer 8.837 5.334 -6.957 6.990
(1.58) (1.01) (-0.73) (1.05)
MktShare 0.620 -2.496 -4.722 8.876**
(0.14) (-0.68) (-0.75) (2.34)
NumProcedures 0.00847 0.0173** 0.00756 0.00992*
(0.91) (2.29) (0.89) (1.66)
Teaching 3.677* 0.237 3.276 2.674
(1.84) (0.13) (1.24) (1.40)
NetIncomeVol -0.148** -0.0426 -0.113 -0.0856
(-2.14) (-0.76) (-1.56) (-1.53)
N 1564 2170 797 2154
adj. R2 0.725 0.745 0.710 0.766
t statistics in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table A.7: Subsample Based on Increase in Assets/Liabilities Fixed Effects
This table contains regressions with average payment as the dependent variable. All regressions include year
fixed effects, controls and standard errors clustered at the state level. Column 1 contains hospitals that did
not increase assets or long-term liabilities from the previous year. Column 2 contains hospitals that had an
increase in assets with no increase in liabilities. Column 3 contains hospitals that increase liabilities with
no increase in assets and Column 4 contains an increase in both assets and liabilities.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NoIncrease AssetIncrease LiabIncrease BothIncrease
Leverage 2.535 10.33* 10.60 3.758
(0.66) (1.75) (1.15) (0.56)
NoSystem 0.281 -0.0103 -10.14**
(0.08) (-0.00) (-2.00)
AvCost 0.0329*** 0.0211*** 0.0349** 0.0165***
(3.37) (3.06) (2.08) (2.88)
CapEx -0.0873 0.0460 0.310 -0.00277
(-0.89) (1.50) (1.58) (-0.13)
NonProfit 3.686 -20.01 -1.784 -9.170*
(0.51) (-1.18) (-0.40) (-1.88)
NetIncomeAssets -0.317* -0.0387** 1.104 1.678
(-1.94) (-2.20) (0.14) (0.27)
NumBeds 0.00575*** 0.0494 0.0758 -0.00637
(2.62) (1.56) (1.32) (-0.22)
Profit -0.352 -16.52 0 -2.802
(-0.04) (-0.84) (.) (-0.36)
HHI Insurer -5.098 -13.09*** -35.15 -14.23
(-0.30) (-2.80) (-1.14) (-0.99)
MktShare -39.08* -21.96 -46.51 -10.55
(-1.68) (-1.23) (-1.13) (-0.51)
NumProcedures -0.0291 -0.0107 -0.0293 -0.00861
(-1.17) (-0.69) (-0.79) (-0.64)
N 1564 2170 797 2154
adj. R2 0.627 0.671 0.656 0.669
t statistics in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table A.8: Payment on Net Leverage by Corporate Type
This table contains cross sectional regressions with AvPayment as the dependent variable
for subsets of hospitals based on their corporate status. Column 1 contains the subset
of for-profit hospitals, Column 2 contains nonprofit hospitals and Column 3 contains the
hospitals that switched from nonprofit to for-profit during my sample.
(1) (2) (3)
Profit NonProfit Switchers
NetLeverage -0.174 3.888* 1.236
(-0.08) (1.87) (0.20)
AvCost 0.0170** 0.0104*** 0.00155
(2.58) (3.47) (0.16)
CapEx 0.00942 0.0102 0.0793
(0.21) (0.66) (1.09)
NoSystem 5.783 0.282 3.431
(1.52) (0.15) (0.30)
NetIncomeAssets 1.333 0.0129 0.0494
(0.58) (0.36) (0.08)
PctOver45 -0.0832 0.358** 1.943**
(-0.33) (2.56) (2.50)
NumBeds -0.000475 0.00282 -0.00880
(-0.05) (1.01) (-0.34)
GeoAdjFactor 391.7*** 362.9*** 389.3***
(26.90) (54.80) (16.47)
HHI Insurer 6.696 7.340 27.89
(0.97) (1.29) (0.89)
MktShare 8.920 -1.155 -29.35**
(1.03) (-0.35) (-2.03)
NumProcedures 0.0145 0.0112** -0.0112
(1.16) (2.09) (-0.39)
Teaching 5.699* 1.361 3.332
(1.75) (0.87) (0.56)
NetIncomeVol -0.195 -0.0718 -0.0244
(-0.97) (-1.55) (-0.06)
N 1160 4709 161
adj. R2 0.675 0.754 0.878
t statistics in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table A.9: Payment on Leverage by Corporate Type with Hospital FE
This table contains hospital fixed effects regressions with AvPayment as the dependent
variable for subsets of hospitals based on their corporate status. Column 1 contains
the subset of for-profit hospitals, Column 2 contains nonprofit hospitals and Column 3
contains the hospitals that switched from nonprofit to for-profit during my sample.
(1) (2) (3)
Profit NonProfit Switchers
Leverage 5.490** 2.599 6.578
(2.16) (0.77) (0.78)
AvCost 0.0249** 0.0201*** 0.00281
(2.42) (4.73) (0.24)




NetIncomeAssets 8.264* 0.00349 0.588
(1.81) (0.26) (0.88)
NumBeds -0.0423 0.00438*** -0.262**
(-0.71) (3.06) (-2.25)
HHI Insurer -3.001 -9.613 -89.81***
(-0.80) (-1.32) (-3.00)
MktShare -17.90 -21.61* -75.71**
(-1.06) (-1.92) (-2.67)
NumProcedures -0.0663** 0.00319 0.0596
(-2.26) (0.42) (1.50)
N 1160 4709 161
adj. R2 0.533 0.674 0.733
t statistics in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Table A.10: Net Leverage on Bargaining Power
This table contains regressions with net hospital leverage as the dependent variable.
All regressions include year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the hospital
level. The first column contains the four variables of interest NegMktShare, HHI Insurer,
System, and NoLaws. The second column contain other MSA level controls and hospital
controls, and the final column contains hospital fixed effects. Variable definitions can be
found in Table 2.1.
(1) (2) (3)
NetLeverage NetLeverage NetLeverage




NegMktShare -0.00565 0.0386 0.150
(-0.15) (1.04) (1.51)
NumHosp 0.00159*** 0.00118*** -0.00107
(3.59) (2.61) (-1.14)




















Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes
N 6685 6685 6685
adj. R2 0.034 0.060 0.031
t statistics in parentheses
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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